fix(deps): harden input sanitization, expand test coverage, bump version

Security:
- Add _INLINE_DANGEROUS_OPTIONS regex to catch pip options after package
  names (--find-links, --constraint, --requirement, --editable, --trusted-host,
  --global-option, --install-option and short forms)
- Stage index URLs in pending_urls, commit only after full line validation
  to prevent URL injection from rejected lines

Tests:
- Add 50 new tests: inline sanitization, false-positive guards, parse
  helpers (_parse_conflicts, _parse_install_output), exception paths
  (91 → 141 total, all pass)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Dr.Lt.Data
2026-03-07 05:35:23 +09:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.6
parent ca8698533d
commit b11aee7c1e
3 changed files with 251 additions and 5 deletions
+38 -4
View File
@@ -94,13 +94,30 @@ class ResolveResult:
_TMP_PREFIX = "comfyui_resolver_"
# Security: reject dangerous requirement patterns.
# Security: reject dangerous requirement patterns at line start.
# NOTE: This regex is intentionally kept alongside _INLINE_DANGEROUS_OPTIONS
# because it covers ``@ file://`` via ``.*@\s*file://`` which relies on the
# ``^`` anchor. Both regexes share responsibility for option rejection:
# this one catches line-start patterns; _INLINE_DANGEROUS_OPTIONS catches
# options appearing after a package name.
_DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = re.compile(
r'^(-r\b|--requirement\b|-e\b|--editable\b|-c\b|--constraint\b'
r'|--find-links\b|-f\b|.*@\s*file://)',
re.IGNORECASE,
)
# Security: reject dangerous pip options appearing anywhere in the line
# (supplements the ^-anchored _DANGEROUS_PATTERNS which only catches line-start).
# The ``(?:^|\s)`` prefix prevents false positives on hyphenated package names
# (e.g. ``re-crypto``, ``package[extra-c]``) while still catching concatenated
# short-flag attacks like ``-fhttps://evil.com``.
_INLINE_DANGEROUS_OPTIONS = re.compile(
r'(?:^|\s)(--find-links\b|--constraint\b|--requirement\b|--editable\b'
r'|--trusted-host\b|--global-option\b|--install-option\b'
r'|-f|-r|-e|-c)',
re.IGNORECASE,
)
# Credential redaction in index URLs.
_CREDENTIAL_PATTERN = re.compile(r'://([^@]+)@')
@@ -293,14 +310,27 @@ class UnifiedDepResolver:
# 1. Separate --index-url / --extra-index-url handling
# (before path separator check, because URLs contain '/')
# URLs are staged but NOT committed until the line passes
# all validation (prevents URL injection from rejected lines).
pending_urls: list[str] = []
if '--index-url' in line or '--extra-index-url' in line:
pkg_spec, index_urls = self._split_index_url(line)
extra_index_urls.extend(index_urls)
pkg_spec, pending_urls = self._split_index_url(line)
line = pkg_spec
if not line:
# Standalone option line (no package prefix)
# Standalone option line (no package prefix) — safe
extra_index_urls.extend(pending_urls)
continue
# 1b. Reject dangerous pip options appearing after package name
# (--index-url/--extra-index-url already extracted above)
if _INLINE_DANGEROUS_OPTIONS.search(line):
skipped.append((line, f"rejected: inline pip option in {pack_path}"))
logger.warning(
"[UnifiedDepResolver] rejected inline pip option: '%s' from %s",
line, pack_path,
)
continue
# Reject path separators in package name portion
pkg_name_part = re.split(r'[><=!~;]', line)[0]
if '/' in pkg_name_part or '\\' in pkg_name_part:
@@ -334,6 +364,10 @@ class UnifiedDepResolver:
)
sources[pkg_name].append(pack_path)
# Commit staged index URLs only after all validation passed.
if pending_urls:
extra_index_urls.extend(pending_urls)
return CollectedDeps(
requirements=requirements,
skipped=skipped,