feat(security): dedicated install flags decoupled from security_level (#2991)

* feat(security): add dedicated install flags decoupled from security_level

Gate 'install via git URL' and 'install via pip' with dedicated opt-in
boolean flags (allow_git_url_install / allow_pip_install) in config.ini
[default], fully replacing the security_level term on those surfaces
(REPLACE, not AND — a strict level no longer denies when the flag is on;
a weak level no longer allows when the flag is off).

- glob/manager_server.py: pure predicate is_dedicated_install_allowed
  (flag AND loopback, request-time args.listen); REPLACE gates at
  /customnode/install/git_url and /customnode/install/pip; batch
  unknown-URL arm routes through the same full predicate at the risky
  position (loopback term is load-bearing — the middle entry gate has
  no network-position term; the entry gate itself stays in force);
  unknown-pip in batch stays unconditionally blocked; new
  SECURITY_MESSAGE_FLAG_* denial constants name the responsible flag;
  security_403_response gains flag_token (comfyui_outdated keeps precedence)
- glob/manager_core.py: register both keys (read via get_bool default-false,
  write list, exception fallback); "true"-only truthy; restart-only activation
- js/common.js: 403 dialog copy names the responsible flag at the two
  install call sites
- README.md: security-policy docs for both flags (per-surface scope incl.
  the batch entry-gate qualifier, REPLACE decoupling, loopback bound,
  opt-in config snippet, default-deny + migration note); stale tier lists
  corrected against the actual gates
- CHANGELOG.md: opt-in migration note + accepted residual risk (flags
  bypass the forced-strong outdated-ComfyUI hardening on loopback,
  opt-in only), decoupling claim qualified for the batch entry gate

Tests: unit suite (predicate truth table, REPLACE litmus both directions,
AST binding-proofs against live handlers, subprocess-isolated config
contract) plus a real-server E2E suite that mounts the Manager-under-test
via git worktree (exact-SHA pin, detached) against a real ComfyUI and
exercises both flag surfaces and both arms — deny arms (403 + flag-naming
body/log + no install artifact), git-URL allow arm (real clone), pip allow
arm as a two-phase reservation oracle — with zero-residual self-clean.
Module skips without E2E_COMFYUI_ROOT; unit suite unaffected.

The manager-v4 branch ships the identical policy (shared invariants +
config contract); this tree uses the degraded predicate 'flag AND
loopback' (no personal_cloud-equivalent mode here).

* bump version to v3.41

glob/manager_core.py

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ import manager_migration
 from node_package import InstalledNodePackage
 
 
-version_code = [3, 40]
+version_code = [3, 41]
 version_str = f"V{version_code[0]}.{version_code[1]}" + (f'.{version_code[2]}' if len(version_code) > 2 else '')
 
 
@@ -1699,6 +1699,8 @@ def write_config():
         'always_lazy_install': get_config()['always_lazy_install'],
         'network_mode': get_config()['network_mode'],
         'db_mode': get_config()['db_mode'],
+        'allow_git_url_install': get_config()['allow_git_url_install'],
+        'allow_pip_install': get_config()['allow_pip_install'],
     }
 
     # Sanitize all string values to prevent CRLF injection attacks
@@ -1745,6 +1747,8 @@ def read_config():
                     'network_mode': default_conf.get('network_mode', 'public').lower(),
                     'security_level': default_conf.get('security_level', 'normal').lower(),
                     'db_mode': default_conf.get('db_mode', 'cache').lower(),
+                    'allow_git_url_install': get_bool('allow_git_url_install', False),
+                    'allow_pip_install': get_bool('allow_pip_install', False),
                }
         manager_migration.force_security_level_if_needed(result)
         return result
@@ -1774,6 +1778,8 @@ def read_config():
             'network_mode': 'public',   # public | private | offline
             'security_level': 'normal', # strong | normal | normal- | weak
             'db_mode': 'cache',         # local | cache | remote
+            'allow_git_url_install': False,
+            'allow_pip_install': False,
         }
         manager_migration.force_security_level_if_needed(result)
         return result