feat(security): dedicated install flags decoupled from security_level (#2991)

* feat(security): add dedicated install flags decoupled from security_level

Gate 'install via git URL' and 'install via pip' with dedicated opt-in
boolean flags (allow_git_url_install / allow_pip_install) in config.ini
[default], fully replacing the security_level term on those surfaces
(REPLACE, not AND — a strict level no longer denies when the flag is on;
a weak level no longer allows when the flag is off).

- glob/manager_server.py: pure predicate is_dedicated_install_allowed
  (flag AND loopback, request-time args.listen); REPLACE gates at
  /customnode/install/git_url and /customnode/install/pip; batch
  unknown-URL arm routes through the same full predicate at the risky
  position (loopback term is load-bearing — the middle entry gate has
  no network-position term; the entry gate itself stays in force);
  unknown-pip in batch stays unconditionally blocked; new
  SECURITY_MESSAGE_FLAG_* denial constants name the responsible flag;
  security_403_response gains flag_token (comfyui_outdated keeps precedence)
- glob/manager_core.py: register both keys (read via get_bool default-false,
  write list, exception fallback); "true"-only truthy; restart-only activation
- js/common.js: 403 dialog copy names the responsible flag at the two
  install call sites
- README.md: security-policy docs for both flags (per-surface scope incl.
  the batch entry-gate qualifier, REPLACE decoupling, loopback bound,
  opt-in config snippet, default-deny + migration note); stale tier lists
  corrected against the actual gates
- CHANGELOG.md: opt-in migration note + accepted residual risk (flags
  bypass the forced-strong outdated-ComfyUI hardening on loopback,
  opt-in only), decoupling claim qualified for the batch entry gate

Tests: unit suite (predicate truth table, REPLACE litmus both directions,
AST binding-proofs against live handlers, subprocess-isolated config
contract) plus a real-server E2E suite that mounts the Manager-under-test
via git worktree (exact-SHA pin, detached) against a real ComfyUI and
exercises both flag surfaces and both arms — deny arms (403 + flag-naming
body/log + no install artifact), git-URL allow arm (real clone), pip allow
arm as a two-phase reservation oracle — with zero-residual self-clean.
Module skips without E2E_COMFYUI_ROOT; unit suite unaffected.

The manager-v4 branch ships the identical policy (shared invariants +
config contract); this tree uses the degraded predicate 'flag AND
loopback' (no personal_cloud-equivalent mode here).

* bump version to v3.41

glob/manager_server.py

@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ SECURITY_MESSAGE_MIDDLE_OR_BELOW = "ERROR: To use this action, a security_level
 SECURITY_MESSAGE_NORMAL_MINUS = "ERROR: To use this feature, you must either set '--listen' to a local IP and set the security level to 'normal-' or lower, or set the security level to 'middle' or 'weak'. Please contact the administrator.\nReference: https://github.com/ltdrdata/ComfyUI-Manager#security-policy"
 SECURITY_MESSAGE_GENERAL = "ERROR: This installation is not allowed in this security_level. Please contact the administrator.\nReference: https://github.com/ltdrdata/ComfyUI-Manager#security-policy"
 SECURITY_MESSAGE_NORMAL_MINUS_MODEL = "ERROR: Downloading models that are not in '.safetensors' format is only allowed for models registered in the 'default' channel at this security level. If you want to download this model, set the security level to 'normal-' or lower."
+SECURITY_MESSAGE_FLAG_GIT_URL = "ERROR: This action requires 'allow_git_url_install = true' in config.ini ([default] section). This setting is independent of security_level. Reference: https://github.com/ltdrdata/ComfyUI-Manager#security-policy"
+SECURITY_MESSAGE_FLAG_PIP = "ERROR: This action requires 'allow_pip_install = true' in config.ini ([default] section). This setting is independent of security_level. Reference: https://github.com/ltdrdata/ComfyUI-Manager#security-policy"
 
 routes = PromptServer.instance.routes
 
@@ -82,6 +84,19 @@ def is_loopback(address):
     except ValueError:
         return False
 
+
+def is_dedicated_install_allowed(flag_value: bool, listen_address: str) -> bool:
+    """P-direct predicate (adopter-degraded form): flag AND loopback.
+
+    Pure helper for the dedicated install flags
+    (allow_git_url_install / allow_pip_install) — callers pass the
+    flag value from their own config read and the listener address
+    from the CLI arguments (request-time evaluation; the import-time
+    snapshot above is NOT consulted).
+    """
+    return bool(flag_value) and is_loopback(listen_address)
+
+
 is_local_mode = is_loopback(args.listen)
 
 
@@ -305,10 +320,18 @@ import zipfile
 import urllib.request
 
 
-def security_403_response():
-    """Return appropriate 403 response based on ComfyUI version."""
+def security_403_response(flag_token=None):
+    """Return appropriate 403 response based on ComfyUI version.
+
+    When `flag_token` is given (dedicated install flag denials), the
+    body names the responsible flag instead of "security_level". The
+    `comfyui_outdated` branch stays the FIRST check regardless, and
+    no-arg callers keep today's body byte-identical.
+    """
     if not manager_migration.has_system_user_api():
         return web.json_response({"error": "comfyui_outdated"}, status=403)
+    if flag_token is not None:
+        return web.json_response({"error": flag_token}, status=403)
     return web.json_response({"error": "security_level"}, status=403)
 
 
@@ -1384,7 +1407,17 @@ async def install_custom_node(request):
         else:
             return web.Response(status=404, text=f"Following node pack doesn't provide `nightly` version: ${git_url}")
 
-    if not is_allowed_security_level(risky_level):
+    if risky_level == 'high':
+        # unknown-URL arm: governed by the dedicated flag predicate
+        # (flag AND loopback, evaluated at request time). The loopback
+        # term is load-bearing here — the 'middle' entry gate above has
+        # no network-position term.
+        if not is_dedicated_install_allowed(core.get_config()['allow_git_url_install'], args.listen):
+            logging.error(SECURITY_MESSAGE_FLAG_GIT_URL)
+            return web.Response(status=404, text="A security error has occurred. Please check the terminal logs")
+    elif not is_allowed_security_level(risky_level):
+        # 'block' arm stays an unconditional deny (is_allowed_security_level
+        # returns False for 'block'); 'middle'/'low' arms unchanged.
         logging.error(SECURITY_MESSAGE_GENERAL)
         return web.Response(status=404, text="A security error has occurred. Please check the terminal logs")
 
@@ -1441,11 +1474,21 @@ async def fix_custom_node(request):
 
 @routes.post("/customnode/install/git_url")
 async def install_custom_node_git_url(request):
-    if not is_allowed_security_level('high'):
-        logging.error(SECURITY_MESSAGE_NORMAL_MINUS)
-        return security_403_response()
+    if not is_dedicated_install_allowed(core.get_config()['allow_git_url_install'], args.listen):
+        logging.error(SECURITY_MESSAGE_FLAG_GIT_URL)
+        return security_403_response(flag_token='allow_git_url_install')
 
-    url = await request.text()
+    # Read the body as JSON (not raw text): a cross-origin <form method=POST>
+    # cannot forge an application/json body without a CORS preflight, which this
+    # server does not answer — same body-handler convention as every other
+    # request.json() route (see _reject_simple_form_content_type docstring).
+    # A malformed body or a missing 'url' is a client error (400), not a 500:
+    # don't let JSONDecodeError/KeyError bubble up as a server fault.
+    try:
+        json_data = await request.json()
+        url = json_data['url']
+    except (KeyError, ValueError):
+        return web.Response(status=400, text="Invalid request body: expected JSON object with a 'url' field")
     res = await core.gitclone_install(url)
 
     if res.action == 'skip':
@@ -1461,11 +1504,18 @@ async def install_custom_node_git_url(request):
 
 @routes.post("/customnode/install/pip")
 async def install_custom_node_pip(request):
-    if not is_allowed_security_level('high'):
-        logging.error(SECURITY_MESSAGE_NORMAL_MINUS)
-        return security_403_response()
+    if not is_dedicated_install_allowed(core.get_config()['allow_pip_install'], args.listen):
+        logging.error(SECURITY_MESSAGE_FLAG_PIP)
+        return security_403_response(flag_token='allow_pip_install')
 
-    packages = await request.text()
+    # JSON body (not raw text) for the same preflight-forcing reason as
+    # /customnode/install/git_url above; malformed body or missing 'packages'
+    # is a 400, not a 500.
+    try:
+        json_data = await request.json()
+        packages = json_data['packages']
+    except (KeyError, ValueError):
+        return web.Response(status=400, text="Invalid request body: expected JSON object with a 'packages' field")
     core.pip_install(packages.split(' '))
 
     return web.Response(status=200)