diff --git a/app/model_downloader/security/ssrf.py b/app/model_downloader/security/ssrf.py
index 388accd6b..5c8bcd64d 100644
--- a/app/model_downloader/security/ssrf.py
+++ b/app/model_downloader/security/ssrf.py
@@ -30,15 +30,29 @@ from aiohttp.resolver import DefaultResolver
 
 from app.model_downloader.security.allowlist import LOOPBACK_HOSTS
 
-# Cap the redirect chain length and the schemes a hop may use.
+# Cap the redirect chain length a hop may use.
 MAX_REDIRECTS = 5
-ALLOWED_SCHEMES = ("https", "http")
 
 
 class SSRFError(Exception):
     """A hop failed an SSRF / allowlist check."""
 
 
+def is_scheme_allowed(scheme: str | None, host: str | None) -> bool:
+    """True iff ``scheme`` is permitted for ``host`` on a download hop.
+
+    https is always allowed; plain http only for loopback/approved dev hosts.
+    """
+    if not scheme:
+        return False
+    scheme = scheme.lower()
+    if scheme == "https":
+        return True
+    if scheme == "http":
+        return bool(host) and host.lower() in LOOPBACK_HOSTS
+    return False
+
+
 def is_blocked_ip(ip_str: str) -> bool:
     """True for any address we refuse to connect to.
 
@@ -92,20 +106,24 @@ def check_redirect_hop(url: str) -> str:
     """Validate one redirect hop's URL.
 
     Returns the URL unchanged on success; raises :class:`SSRFError` otherwise.
-    Enforces an allowed scheme and forbids credentials-in-URL. The host is NOT
-    re-checked against the allowlist (CDN redirect targets are off-list by
-    design); private-IP protection is provided by the connector's resolver,
-    and credential leakage is prevented by exact host matching at attach time.
-    The landing filename's extension is gated separately by the caller.
+    Requires https for external hosts (http only for loopback/approved dev
+    hosts) and forbids credentials-in-URL. The host is NOT re-checked against
+    the allowlist (CDN redirect targets are off-list by design); private-IP
+    protection is provided by the connector's resolver, and credential leakage
+    is prevented by exact host matching at attach time. The landing filename's
+    extension is gated separately by the caller.
     """
     try:
         parsed = urlparse(url)
     except ValueError as e:
         raise SSRFError(f"unparseable redirect URL {url!r}: {e}") from e
-    if parsed.scheme.lower() not in ALLOWED_SCHEMES:
-        raise SSRFError(f"redirect to disallowed scheme {parsed.scheme!r}")
-    if parsed.username or parsed.password:
-        raise SSRFError("credentials-in-URL are not allowed")
     if not parsed.hostname:
         raise SSRFError(f"redirect URL has no host: {url!r}")
+    if not is_scheme_allowed(parsed.scheme, parsed.hostname):
+        raise SSRFError(
+            f"redirect to disallowed scheme {parsed.scheme!r} for host "
+            f"{parsed.hostname!r} (https required for external hosts)"
+        )
+    if parsed.username or parsed.password:
+        raise SSRFError("credentials-in-URL are not allowed")
     return url
diff --git a/tests-unit/model_downloader_test/test_security.py b/tests-unit/model_downloader_test/test_security.py
index db9c25600..01a210bed 100644
--- a/tests-unit/model_downloader_test/test_security.py
+++ b/tests-unit/model_downloader_test/test_security.py
@@ -79,6 +79,15 @@ def test_check_redirect_hop_rejects_bad_scheme_and_userinfo():
     assert check_redirect_hop("https://cdn-lfs.huggingface.co/abc") is not None
 
 
+def test_check_redirect_hop_http_only_for_loopback():
+    # Plain http to an external host is rejected (no plaintext downgrade).
+    with pytest.raises(SSRFError):
+        check_redirect_hop("http://cdn-lfs.huggingface.co/abc")
+    # http is still honored for loopback/approved dev hosts.
+    assert check_redirect_hop("http://localhost/x.safetensors") is not None
+    assert check_redirect_hop("http://127.0.0.1/x.safetensors") is not None
+
+
 # ----- path safety -----