Prevent redirects to loopback/internal IPs (SSRF)

app/model_downloader/net/http.py

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ async def _resolve_final_response(
     current = url
     hops = 0
     while True:
-        check_redirect_hop(current)
+        check_redirect_hop(current, is_initial_url=(hops == 0))
         parts = urlsplit(current)
         auth = await resolve_auth_for_hop(
             parts.hostname or "", parts.scheme, explicit_credential_id=credential_id

app/model_downloader/security/ssrf.py

@@ -9,14 +9,18 @@ Two cooperating layers:
    resolve and the connect happen together inside the connector, there is no
    check-then-connect window for DNS rebinding to exploit.
 
-2. :func:`check_redirect_hop` re-validates every redirect hop. The host
+2. :func:`check_redirect_hop` re-validates every hop. The host allowlist gates
-   allowlist gates only the *initial* user-supplied URL (anti-SSRF for
+   only the *initial* user-supplied URL (anti-SSRF for arbitrary input);
-   arbitrary input); legitimate downloads from allowlisted origins redirect
+   legitimate downloads from allowlisted origins redirect to presigned CDN
-   to presigned CDN hosts that are deliberately NOT on the allowlist (HF ->
+   hosts that are deliberately NOT on the allowlist (HF ->
    ``cdn-lfs*.huggingface.co``, Civitai -> signed Cloudflare/S3), so hops are
    instead screened for scheme, embedded credentials, and — via the resolver
    above — private IPs. Credentials are only ever attached when a hop's host
    exactly matches a stored credential, so they are dropped on the CDN hop.
+   Loopback (the "download a local model" feature) is exempt from IP filtering
+   only for the initial URL: a *redirect* may never target a loopback host or
+   a blocked IP-literal, which the resolver alone can't enforce (it exempts
+   loopback literals and never sees IP literals through DNS).
 """
 
 from __future__ import annotations
@@ -109,28 +113,51 @@ class ValidatingResolver(AbstractResolver):
         await self._inner.close()
 
 
-def check_redirect_hop(url: str) -> str:
+def check_redirect_hop(url: str, *, is_initial_url: bool = False) -> str:
-    """Validate one redirect hop's URL.
+    """Validate one hop's URL.
 
     Returns the URL unchanged on success; raises :class:`SSRFError` otherwise.
     Requires https for external hosts (http only for loopback/approved dev
     hosts) and forbids credentials-in-URL. The host is NOT re-checked against
-    the allowlist (CDN redirect targets are off-list by design); private-IP
+    the allowlist (CDN redirect targets are off-list by design); credential
-    protection is provided by the connector's resolver, and credential leakage
+    leakage is prevented by exact host matching at attach time, and the landing
-    is prevented by exact host matching at attach time. The landing filename's
+    filename's extension is gated separately by the caller.
-    extension is gated separately by the caller.
+
+    Loopback/blocked-IP screening: the connector's resolver filters resolvable
+    hostnames but exempts literal loopback hosts (``localhost``/``127.0.0.1``/
+    ``::1``) and never sees IP literals through DNS. That loopback exemption is
+    legitimate only for the *initial* user-supplied URL (``is_initial_url``);
+    on a redirect hop we reject loopback hosts and any blocked IP-literal here,
+    so a 30x can't steer a server-side GET at loopback/internal services.
     """
     try:
         parsed = urlparse(url)
     except ValueError as e:
         raise SSRFError(f"unparseable redirect URL {url!r}: {e}") from e
-    if not parsed.hostname:
+    host = parsed.hostname
+    if not host:
         raise SSRFError(f"redirect URL has no host: {url!r}")
-    if not is_scheme_allowed(parsed.scheme, parsed.hostname):
+    if not is_scheme_allowed(parsed.scheme, host):
         raise SSRFError(
             f"redirect to disallowed scheme {parsed.scheme!r} for host "
-            f"{parsed.hostname!r} (https required for external hosts)"
+            f"{host!r} (https required for external hosts)"
         )
     if parsed.username or parsed.password:
         raise SSRFError("credentials-in-URL are not allowed")
+    host_is_loopback = host.lower() in LOOPBACK_HOSTS
+    if not is_initial_url and host_is_loopback:
+        raise SSRFError(f"redirect to loopback host {host!r} is not allowed")
+    # IP-literal targets never go through DNS, so the connector's resolver can't
+    # screen them — check them directly. The only blocked IP allowed through is
+    # a loopback literal on the initial URL (handled by the exemption above).
+    try:
+        ipaddress.ip_address(host)
+    except ValueError:
+        is_ip_literal = False
+    else:
+        is_ip_literal = True
+    if is_ip_literal and is_blocked_ip(host) and not (
+        is_initial_url and host_is_loopback
+    ):
+        raise SSRFError(f"redirect to blocked internal address {host!r}")
     return url

tests-unit/model_downloader_test/test_security.py

@@ -89,9 +89,33 @@ def test_check_redirect_hop_http_only_for_loopback():
     # Plain http to an external host is rejected (no plaintext downgrade).
     with pytest.raises(SSRFError):
         check_redirect_hop("http://cdn-lfs.huggingface.co/abc")
-    # http is still honored for loopback/approved dev hosts.
+    # http is honored for loopback only on the initial user-supplied URL (the
-    assert check_redirect_hop("http://localhost/x.safetensors") is not None
+    # "download a local model" feature).
-    assert check_redirect_hop("http://127.0.0.1/x.safetensors") is not None
+    assert (
+        check_redirect_hop("http://localhost/x.safetensors", is_initial_url=True)
+        is not None
+    )
+    assert (
+        check_redirect_hop("http://127.0.0.1/x.safetensors", is_initial_url=True)
+        is not None
+    )
+
+
+def test_check_redirect_hop_blocks_loopback_and_ip_literals_on_redirect():
+    # A redirect (is_initial_url=False, the default) must never reach loopback,
+    # whether by hostname or by IP literal, nor any other internal IP literal.
+    for target in (
+        "http://localhost/x.safetensors",
+        "http://127.0.0.1/x.safetensors",
+        "https://[::1]/x.safetensors",
+        "https://169.254.169.254/x.safetensors",  # cloud metadata
+        "https://10.0.0.5/x.safetensors",  # RFC1918
+    ):
+        with pytest.raises(SSRFError):
+            check_redirect_hop(target)
+    # Off-allowlist public CDN hosts (hostnames) remain valid redirect targets;
+    # their resolved IPs are screened by the connector's resolver.
+    assert check_redirect_hop("https://cdn-lfs.huggingface.co/abc") is not None
 
 
 # ----- path safety -----