diff --git a/tests-unit/security_test/test_ghsa_779p_03_annotated_traversal.py b/tests-unit/security_test/test_ghsa_779p_03_annotated_traversal.py
index 59c09085c..88102760c 100644
--- a/tests-unit/security_test/test_ghsa_779p_03_annotated_traversal.py
+++ b/tests-unit/security_test/test_ghsa_779p_03_annotated_traversal.py
@@ -87,8 +87,14 @@ def test_is_within_directory_symlink_escape(sandbox):
         f.write("top secret")
 
     # Plant a symlink inside base that points at the outside directory.
+    # symlink creation can require elevated privileges / Developer Mode on
+    # Windows, so skip cleanly where it isn't available (same guard as the
+    # sibling test in test_ghsa_779p_02_preview_traversal.py).
     link = os.path.join(base, "escape_link")
-    os.symlink(outside, link)
+    try:
+        os.symlink(outside, link)
+    except (OSError, NotImplementedError):
+        pytest.skip("symlinks not supported on this platform/filesystem")
 
     # Accessing the secret "through" the in-base symlink must be rejected.
     target_via_link = os.path.join(link, "secret.txt")
diff --git a/tests-unit/security_test/test_ghsa_779p_05_dangerous_content_types.py b/tests-unit/security_test/test_ghsa_779p_05_dangerous_content_types.py
index b7a1507cf..0e9355b2a 100644
--- a/tests-unit/security_test/test_ghsa_779p_05_dangerous_content_types.py
+++ b/tests-unit/security_test/test_ghsa_779p_05_dangerous_content_types.py
@@ -5,13 +5,18 @@ blocklist covered text/html, text/javascript, etc. but was missing
 image/svg+xml, so an uploaded SVG carrying an inline <script> was served as
 image/svg+xml and executed in the page origin when rendered.
 
-The /view forced-download decision lives in a closure inside
-server.PromptServer.add_routes (server.py ~line 624), which checks
-`content_type in folder_paths.DANGEROUS_CONTENT_TYPES` and, on a match, rewrites
-the response to application/octet-stream with a Content-Disposition: attachment
-header. server.py cannot be imported in a unit test (importing it spins up the
-full PromptServer/aiohttp app and its global side effects), so these tests pin
-the *data* that drives the closure: folder_paths.DANGEROUS_CONTENT_TYPES.
+The /view forced-download decision lives in the view_image closure registered by
+server.PromptServer.add_routes (server.py ~line 596), which calls
+`folder_paths.is_dangerous_content_type(content_type)` — a normalising check that
+strips charset/boundary parameters and casing and folds in the whole */xml and
+*+xml dialect family — rather than a bypassable raw
+`content_type in folder_paths.DANGEROUS_CONTENT_TYPES` membership test. On a match
+it rewrites the response to application/octet-stream with a
+Content-Disposition: attachment header. server.py cannot be imported in a unit
+test (importing it spins up the full PromptServer/aiohttp app and its global side
+effects), so these tests pin the underlying dangerous-content data
+(folder_paths.DANGEROUS_CONTENT_TYPES) and the normalising is_dangerous_content_type()
+helper that the closure actually calls.
 
 The end-to-end /view assertion (upload an SVG, GET /view, confirm the response
 is not served as image/svg+xml) lives in the live POC at