Merge c8b3d54cf8 into 96e0e3585b

app/model_downloader/allowlist.py

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+"""URL allowlist for server-side model fetches.
+
+Mirrors the frontend's ``isModelDownloadable`` allowlist so the two flows
+agree on which URLs are eligible for download. Server-side allowlisting is
+the primary SSRF defense for this subsystem — workflow JSON is untrusted
+input (anyone can hand-craft one), so we never let the server fetch URLs
+outside this list.
+"""
+
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+# Frontend parity: ``missingModelDownload-*.js`` exports the same triple
+# (Civitai / HuggingFace / localhost). Keyed by exact hostname → allowed
+# schemes, and matched against the *parsed* host (not a raw string prefix),
+# so URL-userinfo tricks can't slip past — see ``is_url_allowed``.
+_ALLOWED_HOSTS = {
+    "huggingface.co": {"https"},
+    "civitai.com": {"https"},
+    "localhost": {"http"},
+    "127.0.0.1": {"http"},
+}
+
+# Frontend parity: same set as ``a = [...]`` in the bundle.
+_ALLOWED_MODEL_EXTENSIONS = (
+    ".safetensors",
+    ".sft",
+    ".ckpt",
+    ".pth",
+    ".pt",
+)
+
+
+def is_url_allowed(url: str) -> bool:
+    """Check whether ``url`` is permitted as a server-side download source.
+
+    True only when the parsed host + scheme are allowlisted AND the path ends
+    in a model extension. Matching on ``parsed.hostname`` (not a string prefix)
+    defeats userinfo tricks like ``http://127.0.0.1:80@169.254.169.254/x.safetensors``,
+    whose real host is ``169.254.169.254``; the extension check rejects non-model
+    URLs on allowed hosts (e.g. ``huggingface.co/api/...``).
+    """
+    if not isinstance(url, str) or not url:
+        return False
+    try:
+        parsed = urlparse(url)
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+    host = parsed.hostname
+    if host is None or parsed.scheme not in _ALLOWED_HOSTS.get(host, ()):
+        return False
+    return any(parsed.path.endswith(ext) for ext in _ALLOWED_MODEL_EXTENSIONS)

app/model_downloader/api/routes.py

@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
+"""Aiohttp routes for the server-side model download subsystem.
+
+Endpoint surface (all under ``/api/``, all kebab-case):
+
+  - ``POST /api/models-availability-status``     — bulk status + metadata query.
+  - ``POST /api/download-models``                — start a batch of downloads.
+  - ``POST /api/cancel-model-download-session``  — cancel a single in-flight one.
+  - ``GET  /api/hf-auth-token-status``           — current HF login state.
+  - ``POST /api/hf-auth-login-start``            — begin the HF OAuth flow.
+  - ``POST /api/hf-auth-logout``                 — drop the stored HF token.
+
+The contract is intentionally narrow: only model_ids of the form
+``<directory>/<filename>`` (validated via ``app.model_downloader.paths``)
+are accepted, and only URLs on the same allowlist the frontend already
+uses (HuggingFace, Civitai, localhost) can be fetched. Both are required
+to keep the server out of the SSRF business for this feature.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import json
+import logging
+from typing import Any, Literal, Optional
+
+from aiohttp import web
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ValidationError
+
+from app.model_downloader.allowlist import is_url_allowed
+from app.model_downloader.download_server import (
+    DOWNLOAD_SERVER,
+    DownloadSession,
+)
+from app.model_downloader.downloader import schedule_batch
+from app.model_downloader.gated_detection import probe_url
+from app.model_downloader.hf_auth.auth_store import HF_AUTH_STORE
+from app.model_downloader.hf_auth.eligibility import is_hf_auth_eligible
+from app.model_downloader.hf_auth.oauth import (
+    OAuthCallbackError,
+    OAuthInProgressError,
+    start_login_flow,
+)
+from app.model_downloader.paths import (
+    InvalidModelId,
+    parse_model_id,
+    resolve_existing,
+)
+from app.model_downloader.api import schemas_in, schemas_out
+
+ROUTES = web.RouteTableDef()
+
+
+def register_routes(app: web.Application) -> None:
+    """Wire the model-downloader routes into the running aiohttp app.
+
+    Called once from ``server.py`` during ``PromptServer`` startup.
+    """
+    app.add_routes(ROUTES)
+
+
+# ----- response helpers (same envelope as app/assets/api/routes.py) -----
+
+
+ErrorCode = Literal[
+    "INVALID_JSON",
+    "INVALID_BODY",
+    "EMPTY_REQUEST",
+    "INVALID_MODEL_ID",
+    "URL_NOT_ALLOWED",
+    "ALREADY_AVAILABLE",
+    "ALREADY_DOWNLOADING",
+    "MODEL_NOT_DOWNLOADABLE",
+    "NOT_DOWNLOADING",
+    "HF_AUTH_NOT_ELIGIBLE",
+    "HF_AUTH_IN_PROGRESS",
+    "HF_AUTH_START_FAILED",
+]
+
+
+def _error(status: int, code: ErrorCode, message: str, details: dict | None = None) -> web.Response:
+    return web.json_response(
+        {"error": {"code": code, "message": message, "details": details or {}}},
+        status=status,
+    )
+
+
+def _validation_error(code: ErrorCode, ve: ValidationError) -> web.Response:
+    return _error(400, code, "Validation failed.", {"errors": json.loads(ve.json())})
+
+
+def _ok(payload: BaseModel, status: int = 200) -> web.Response:
+    return web.json_response(
+        payload.model_dump(mode="json", exclude_none=False),
+        status=status,
+    )
+
+
+async def _parse_body(request: web.Request, model: type[BaseModel]) -> Any:
+    """Parse a JSON body into a pydantic model or raise a 400 response."""
+    try:
+        raw = await request.json()
+    except json.JSONDecodeError:
+        return _error(400, "INVALID_JSON", "Request body must be valid JSON.")
+    try:
+        return model.model_validate(raw)
+    except ValidationError as ve:
+        return _validation_error("INVALID_BODY", ve)
+
+
+# ----- 1. availability status (unified: state + metadata per id) -----
+
+
+@ROUTES.post("/api/models-availability-status")
+async def models_availability_status(request: web.Request) -> web.Response:
+    """Return per-id ``{state, progress, file_size, is_hf_downloadable}``.
+
+    State (``available`` / ``missing`` / ``downloading``) is cheap to
+    recompute per call. ``file_size`` and ``is_gated`` are cached
+    server-side per URL. ``is_hf_downloadable`` is recomputed every
+    call from the current token state — that's what makes login + license
+    acceptance show up in the UI within one poll cycle without any
+    frontend cache plumbing.
+    """
+    parsed = await _parse_body(request, schemas_in.AvailabilityStatusRequest)
+    if isinstance(parsed, web.Response):
+        return parsed
+
+    items = list(parsed.models.items())
+
+    # Run all probes concurrently; each is internally cached per URL.
+    probes = await asyncio.gather(*(probe_url(url) for _, url in items))
+
+    response_models: dict[str, schemas_out.ModelStatusEntry] = {}
+    for (model_id, _url), probe in zip(items, probes):
+        try:
+            parse_model_id(model_id)
+        except InvalidModelId:
+            # Ill-formed identifier: report as missing without 400-ing the
+            # whole batch — the workflow author probably typo'd.
+            response_models[model_id] = schemas_out.ModelStatusEntry(
+                state="missing",
+                file_size=probe.file_size,
+                is_hf_downloadable=probe.is_hf_downloadable,
+            )
+            continue
+
+        active = DOWNLOAD_SERVER.get(model_id)
+        if active is not None:
+            response_models[model_id] = schemas_out.ModelStatusEntry(
+                state="downloading",
+                progress=schemas_out.DownloadProgress(
+                    bytes_downloaded=active.bytes_downloaded,
+                    total_bytes=active.total_bytes,
+                    progress=active.progress,
+                ),
+                file_size=probe.file_size,
+                is_hf_downloadable=probe.is_hf_downloadable,
+            )
+            continue
+
+        state: schemas_out.ModelState = (
+            "available" if resolve_existing(model_id) is not None else "missing"
+        )
+        response_models[model_id] = schemas_out.ModelStatusEntry(
+            state=state,
+            file_size=probe.file_size,
+            is_hf_downloadable=probe.is_hf_downloadable,
+        )
+
+    return _ok(schemas_out.AvailabilityStatusResponse(
+        models=response_models,
+        hf_auth=schemas_out.HfAuthStatus(
+            token_available=HF_AUTH_STORE.has_token(),
+            eligible=is_hf_auth_eligible(),
+        ),
+    ))
+
+
+# ----- 2. start downloads -----
+
+
+@ROUTES.post("/api/download-models")
+async def download_models(request: web.Request) -> web.Response:
+    parsed = await _parse_body(request, schemas_in.DownloadModelsRequest)
+    if isinstance(parsed, web.Response):
+        return parsed
+
+    if not parsed.models:
+        return _error(400, "EMPTY_REQUEST", "No models supplied.")
+
+    # ----- precondition pass: validate everything BEFORE registering anything -----
+    # Atomic semantics: if any model fails any precondition (invalid id,
+    # not allow-listed URL, already on disk, already downloading, or gated),
+    # the entire request fails and no state is changed.
+    requested = list(parsed.models.items())
+
+    for model_id, url in requested:
+        try:
+            parse_model_id(model_id)
+        except InvalidModelId as e:
+            return _error(400, "INVALID_MODEL_ID", str(e),
+                          {"model_id": model_id})
+
+        if not is_url_allowed(url):
+            return _error(
+                400, "URL_NOT_ALLOWED",
+                "Server-side downloads only accept HuggingFace, Civitai, "
+                "or localhost URLs ending in a known model extension.",
+                {"model_id": model_id, "url": url},
+            )
+
+        if resolve_existing(model_id) is not None:
+            return _error(409, "ALREADY_AVAILABLE",
+                          f"Model already exists on disk: {model_id}",
+                          {"model_id": model_id})
+
+        if DOWNLOAD_SERVER.is_downloading(model_id):
+            return _error(409, "ALREADY_DOWNLOADING",
+                          f"A download for {model_id} is already in progress.",
+                          {"model_id": model_id})
+
+    # Reachability check last — it's the only one that talks to the
+    # network. Concurrent probes. For HF URLs ``is_hf_downloadable``
+    # reflects current token access; for non-HF URLs it's None, and we
+    # treat that as "no info, proceed".
+    probes = await asyncio.gather(*(probe_url(url) for _, url in requested))
+    for (model_id, url), probe in zip(requested, probes):
+        if probe.is_hf_downloadable is False:
+            return _error(
+                400, "MODEL_NOT_DOWNLOADABLE",
+                f"Model {model_id} is gated on HuggingFace and the current "
+                f"server token (if any) does not grant access.",
+                {"model_id": model_id, "url": url},
+            )
+
+    # ----- registration pass: try_register is atomic per model_id -----
+    # Defensive: another request might have raced past our pre-check
+    # between the loop above and here. try_register handles that.
+    sessions: list[DownloadSession] = []
+    for model_id, url in requested:
+        session = DOWNLOAD_SERVER.try_register(model_id, url)
+        if session is None:
+            # Race: someone else got in. Roll back what we registered.
+            for s in sessions:
+                DOWNLOAD_SERVER.cancel(s.model_id)
+            return _error(409, "ALREADY_DOWNLOADING",
+                          f"A download for {model_id} is already in progress (race).",
+                          {"model_id": model_id})
+        sessions.append(session)
+
+    DOWNLOAD_SERVER.sweep_orphan_tmp_files()
+    schedule_batch(sessions)
+    logging.info(
+        "[model_downloader] scheduled %d downloads: %s",
+        len(sessions), [s.model_id for s in sessions],
+    )
+
+    return _ok(schemas_out.DownloadModelsResponse(
+        accepted=True,
+        scheduled=[s.model_id for s in sessions],
+    ), status=202)
+
+
+# ----- 3. cancel a session -----
+
+
+@ROUTES.post("/api/cancel-model-download-session")
+async def cancel_model_download_session(request: web.Request) -> web.Response:
+    parsed = await _parse_body(request, schemas_in.CancelDownloadSessionRequest)
+    if isinstance(parsed, web.Response):
+        return parsed
+
+    try:
+        parse_model_id(parsed.model_id)
+    except InvalidModelId as e:
+        return _error(400, "INVALID_MODEL_ID", str(e), {"model_id": parsed.model_id})
+
+    cancelled = DOWNLOAD_SERVER.cancel(parsed.model_id)
+    if not cancelled:
+        return _error(404, "NOT_DOWNLOADING",
+                      f"No active download for {parsed.model_id}.",
+                      {"model_id": parsed.model_id})
+
+    return _ok(schemas_out.CancelDownloadSessionResponse(cancelled=True))
+
+
+# ----- 4. HuggingFace OAuth status / login start / logout -----
+
+
+@ROUTES.get("/api/hf-auth-token-status")
+async def hf_auth_token_status(request: web.Request) -> web.Response:
+    """Return whether the server holds a usable HF token + its username.
+
+    Used by the settings UI and (out-of-band) by the frontend on
+    login completion. ``token_available`` is true even if the cached
+    access_token is expired — as long as a refresh_token exists, the
+    user is "logged in" from their perspective.
+    """
+    token_present = HF_AUTH_STORE.has_token()
+    username: Optional[str] = None
+    if token_present:
+        # Resolve the username via whoami. Done in a worker thread because
+        # huggingface_hub's whoami is synchronous + blocks on a network call.
+        tok = await HF_AUTH_STORE.get_valid_token()
+        if tok is not None:
+            try:
+                username = await asyncio.to_thread(_whoami_username, tok.access_token)
+            except Exception as e:
+                logging.debug("[hf_auth] whoami failed: %s", e)
+    return _ok(schemas_out.HfAuthTokenStatusResponse(
+        token_available=token_present,
+        username=username,
+    ))
+
+
+def _whoami_username(token: str) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Sync helper: ask HF for the user name attached to a token."""
+    from huggingface_hub import HfApi
+    info = HfApi().whoami(token=token)
+    if isinstance(info, dict):
+        return info.get("name") or info.get("fullname")
+    return None
+
+
+@ROUTES.post("/api/hf-auth-login-start")
+async def hf_auth_login_start(request: web.Request) -> web.Response:
+    """Begin one OAuth attempt: bind the callback port, return the URL.
+
+    Rejected outright if this deployment isn't eligible (we don't
+    surface the option on multi-tenant / public-IP installs).
+    """
+    if not is_hf_auth_eligible():
+        return _error(
+            403, "HF_AUTH_NOT_ELIGIBLE",
+            "This server is not eligible for interactive HuggingFace login. "
+            "It must be bound to a loopback address and not running in "
+            "--multi-user mode.",
+        )
+    try:
+        url = await start_login_flow()
+    except OAuthInProgressError:
+        return _error(
+            409, "HF_AUTH_IN_PROGRESS",
+            "Another HuggingFace login attempt is in progress. Try again "
+            "after it completes or times out.",
+        )
+    except OAuthCallbackError as e:
+        return _error(
+            503, "HF_AUTH_START_FAILED",
+            f"Could not start the HuggingFace login flow: {e}",
+        )
+    return _ok(schemas_out.HfAuthLoginStartResponse(authorize_url=url))
+
+
+@ROUTES.post("/api/hf-auth-logout")
+async def hf_auth_logout(request: web.Request) -> web.Response:
+    """Drop the in-memory + on-disk HF token."""
+    HF_AUTH_STORE.clear()
+    return _ok(schemas_out.HfAuthLogoutResponse(logged_out=True))

app/model_downloader/api/schemas_in.py

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+"""Request schemas for the model-downloader API.
+
+Each endpoint accepts a small JSON body. Pydantic enforces the shape at
+the boundary; route handlers operate only on validated values past that.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
+
+
+class AvailabilityStatusRequest(BaseModel):
+    """``POST /api/models-availability-status``.
+
+    Sent by the frontend on each poll. Each entry is ``{model_id: url}``;
+    the URL is the one declared in ``properties.models[i].url`` in the
+    workflow JSON and lets the server compute per-id metadata
+    (``file_size`` + ``is_hf_downloadable``) on the same request.
+    """
+    models: dict[str, str] = Field(default_factory=dict)
+
+
+class DownloadModelsRequest(BaseModel):
+    """``POST /api/download-models``.
+
+    Same shape as the metadata request — the URL for each model_id.
+    Returns immediately after validation and scheduling.
+    """
+    models: dict[str, str] = Field(default_factory=dict)
+
+
+class CancelDownloadSessionRequest(BaseModel):
+    """``POST /api/cancel-model-download-session``."""
+    model_id: str
+
+
+__all__ = [
+    "AvailabilityStatusRequest",
+    "DownloadModelsRequest",
+    "CancelDownloadSessionRequest",
+]

app/model_downloader/api/schemas_out.py

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+"""Response schemas for the model-downloader API."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Literal, Optional
+
+from pydantic import BaseModel
+
+
+ModelState = Literal["available", "missing", "downloading"]
+
+
+class DownloadProgress(BaseModel):
+    """Embedded in a model entry when its state is ``downloading``."""
+    bytes_downloaded: int
+    total_bytes: Optional[int] = None
+    progress: Optional[float] = None  # fraction in [0,1]; null until total known
+
+
+class ModelStatusEntry(BaseModel):
+    """Everything the UI needs to render one row, in one shot.
+
+    ``state`` reflects what the server has on disk + in-flight; ``file_size``
+    and ``is_hf_downloadable`` come from probes (intrinsic; cached).
+    The HF fields are populated for every poll (cached on the server),
+    so license-acceptance flips show up within one poll interval without
+    any frontend cache invalidation.
+    """
+    state: ModelState
+    progress: Optional[DownloadProgress] = None
+    file_size: Optional[int] = None
+    # HF-only: True iff the server can fetch this URL with current auth
+    # state. False iff gated and lacking access. None for non-HF URLs.
+    is_hf_downloadable: Optional[bool] = None
+
+
+class HfAuthStatus(BaseModel):
+    """Snapshot of HF login state, embedded in availability response."""
+    token_available: bool
+    eligible: bool
+
+
+class AvailabilityStatusResponse(BaseModel):
+    models: dict[str, ModelStatusEntry]
+    hf_auth: HfAuthStatus
+
+
+class DownloadModelsResponse(BaseModel):
+    accepted: bool
+    scheduled: list[str]
+
+
+class CancelDownloadSessionResponse(BaseModel):
+    cancelled: bool
+
+
+class HfAuthTokenStatusResponse(BaseModel):
+    token_available: bool
+    username: Optional[str] = None
+
+
+class HfAuthLoginStartResponse(BaseModel):
+    authorize_url: str
+
+
+class HfAuthLogoutResponse(BaseModel):
+    logged_out: bool
+
+
+__all__ = [
+    "ModelState",
+    "DownloadProgress",
+    "ModelStatusEntry",
+    "HfAuthStatus",
+    "AvailabilityStatusResponse",
+    "DownloadModelsResponse",
+    "CancelDownloadSessionResponse",
+    "HfAuthTokenStatusResponse",
+    "HfAuthLoginStartResponse",
+    "HfAuthLogoutResponse",
+]

app/model_downloader/download_server.py

@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+"""Process-wide registry of in-flight model downloads.
+
+A single instance, ``DOWNLOAD_SERVER``, tracks every currently-running
+server-side model fetch. Designed to be safe with multiple concurrent
+clients hitting the API: each model_id has at most one active session,
+and the API rejects requests that conflict with in-flight downloads.
+
+Cancellation is cooperative — the download loop checks ``is_active`` on
+its own session between chunks and raises ``DownloadCancelled`` when the
+session has been removed from the registry. This avoids the complications
+of ``Task.cancel()`` from outside the loop while still giving deterministic
+rollback semantics (the worker is responsible for deleting its own
+``.tmp`` on the cancel path).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+import os
+import threading
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from typing import Optional
+
+from app.model_downloader.paths import iter_all_tmp_paths
+
+
+class DownloadCancelled(Exception):
+    """Raised by the streaming loop when its session has been removed
+    from the registry (cancellation request) and the worker should roll
+    back its ``.tmp`` file."""
+
+
+@dataclass
+class DownloadSession:
+    """One in-flight download.
+
+    ``progress`` is a fraction in ``[0.0, 1.0]``; ``None`` until the first
+    byte arrives and we know whether the response carries a
+    ``Content-Length``. ``total_bytes`` mirrors that header when present.
+    """
+    model_id: str
+    url: str
+    progress: Optional[float] = None
+    bytes_downloaded: int = 0
+    total_bytes: Optional[int] = None
+    # Sequence number used solely as identity for the cancellation check —
+    # so that "cancel + restart" doesn't get confused by stale workers.
+    epoch: int = field(default_factory=lambda: 0)
+
+
+class DownloadServer:
+    """Singleton registry of active downloads.
+
+    All mutation goes through this object so concurrent route handlers
+    see a consistent view. The ``_lock`` is a plain threading lock
+    because the registry is consulted from both the asyncio event-loop
+    thread (route handlers) and from any worker coroutines spawned to
+    perform downloads.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+        self._sessions: dict[str, DownloadSession] = {}
+        self._epoch_counter = 0
+        self._orphan_sweep_done = False
+
+    # ----- lifecycle -----
+
+    def sweep_orphan_tmp_files(self) -> None:
+        """Idempotently sweep ``*.tmp`` files left by crashed downloads.
+
+        Deferred off the import path so module load doesn't block on
+        filesystem I/O against potentially-slow mounts. Each route handler
+        that might create a new ``.tmp`` runs this exactly once.
+        """
+        with self._lock:
+            if self._orphan_sweep_done:
+                return
+            self._orphan_sweep_done = True
+        for path in iter_all_tmp_paths():
+            try:
+                os.remove(path)
+                logging.info("[model_downloader] removed orphan tmp file: %s", path)
+            except OSError as e:
+                logging.warning("[model_downloader] could not remove %s: %s", path, e)
+
+    # ----- queries -----
+
+    def is_downloading(self, model_id: str) -> bool:
+        with self._lock:
+            return model_id in self._sessions
+
+    def get(self, model_id: str) -> Optional[DownloadSession]:
+        with self._lock:
+            return self._sessions.get(model_id)
+
+    def snapshot(self) -> dict[str, DownloadSession]:
+        """Return a shallow copy of the current sessions map."""
+        with self._lock:
+            return dict(self._sessions)
+
+    # ----- mutations -----
+
+    def try_register(self, model_id: str, url: str) -> Optional[DownloadSession]:
+        """Atomically register a new session iff none exists for ``model_id``.
+
+        Returns the new session on success, ``None`` if a session is already
+        in flight. Callers must check the return value — the caller is the
+        sole owner of the session it gets back.
+        """
+        with self._lock:
+            if model_id in self._sessions:
+                return None
+            self._epoch_counter += 1
+            session = DownloadSession(
+                model_id=model_id,
+                url=url,
+                epoch=self._epoch_counter,
+            )
+            self._sessions[model_id] = session
+            return session
+
+    def update_progress(
+        self,
+        session: DownloadSession,
+        bytes_downloaded: int,
+        total_bytes: Optional[int],
+    ) -> None:
+        """Update progress on a session. No-op if the session has been
+        removed (cancelled) — caller should check ``is_active`` separately."""
+        with self._lock:
+            current = self._sessions.get(session.model_id)
+            if current is None or current.epoch != session.epoch:
+                return
+            current.bytes_downloaded = bytes_downloaded
+            current.total_bytes = total_bytes
+            if total_bytes and total_bytes > 0:
+                current.progress = min(1.0, bytes_downloaded / total_bytes)
+
+    def is_active(self, session: DownloadSession) -> bool:
+        """True iff this exact session is still the registered one for
+        its model_id. False after cancellation, after completion, or if
+        another session has replaced it."""
+        with self._lock:
+            current = self._sessions.get(session.model_id)
+            return current is not None and current.epoch == session.epoch
+
+    def finish(self, session: DownloadSession) -> None:
+        """Remove a completed (or cancelled) session from the registry.
+
+        Safe to call multiple times. Only removes if the epoch matches —
+        we never accidentally evict a *newer* session for the same model_id.
+        """
+        with self._lock:
+            current = self._sessions.get(session.model_id)
+            if current is not None and current.epoch == session.epoch:
+                del self._sessions[session.model_id]
+
+    def reset_for_tests(self) -> None:
+        """Clear all sessions and reset the epoch counter. Test-only."""
+        with self._lock:
+            self._sessions.clear()
+            self._epoch_counter = 0
+
+    def cancel(self, model_id: str) -> bool:
+        """Remove the session registered for ``model_id``.
+
+        Returns True if there was an active session to cancel. The worker
+        will discover the cancellation on its next ``is_active`` check
+        and roll back its ``.tmp`` file.
+        """
+        with self._lock:
+            if model_id in self._sessions:
+                del self._sessions[model_id]
+                return True
+            return False
+
+
+DOWNLOAD_SERVER = DownloadServer()

app/model_downloader/downloader.py

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+"""Streaming download worker with progress reporting and cancellation.
+
+Each download writes to ``<final_path>.tmp`` and atomically renames into
+place on success. Between chunks the worker checks the registry for
+cancellation (via ``DownloadServer.is_active``) and rolls back its
+``.tmp`` on cancel or on any error.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import logging
+import os
+from typing import Optional
+
+import aiohttp
+
+from app.model_downloader.download_server import (
+    DOWNLOAD_SERVER,
+    DownloadCancelled,
+    DownloadSession,
+)
+from app.model_downloader.hf_auth.auth_store import HF_AUTH_STORE
+from app.model_downloader.hf_url import is_hf_url
+from app.model_downloader.http_client import get_session, parse_content_length
+from app.model_downloader.paths import resolve_destination
+
+
+CHUNK_SIZE = 64 * 1024  # 64 KiB — same scale as other ComfyUI download paths.
+REQUEST_TIMEOUT = aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=None, sock_connect=30, sock_read=120)
+
+
+async def stream_to_disk(session: DownloadSession) -> str:
+    """Run a single download to completion or cancellation.
+
+    Returns the final on-disk path on success. Removes the ``.tmp`` and
+    raises on cancellation or failure. The session is finished
+    (removed from the registry) exactly once, here — callers do not
+    need to call ``DOWNLOAD_SERVER.finish`` themselves.
+    """
+    final_path, tmp_path = resolve_destination(session.model_id, session.epoch)
+    os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(final_path), exist_ok=True)
+
+    # Wipe any stale .tmp from a previous failed attempt before we start —
+    # otherwise a partial body could masquerade as our completed download
+    # when the rename finally happens.
+    _remove_if_exists(tmp_path)
+
+    bytes_seen = 0
+    try:
+        http = await get_session()
+        headers = _auth_headers_for(session.url)
+        logging.info(
+            "[model_downloader] starting GET %s (auth=%s)",
+            session.url, "yes" if "Authorization" in headers else "no",
+        )
+        async with http.get(
+            session.url,
+            allow_redirects=True,
+            timeout=REQUEST_TIMEOUT,
+            headers=headers,
+        ) as resp:
+            if resp.status != 200:
+                # Capture a snippet of the response body so 4xx/5xx aren't
+                # opaque in the logs — HF returns JSON or HTML with a
+                # human-readable reason on failures.
+                body_snippet = await _read_short(resp)
+                logging.warning(
+                    "[model_downloader] GET %s failed: status=%d final_url=%s body=%s",
+                    session.url, resp.status, str(resp.url), body_snippet,
+                )
+                raise DownloadError(
+                    f"unexpected HTTP {resp.status} fetching {session.url}: {body_snippet}",
+                    status=resp.status,
+                )
+
+            total = parse_content_length(resp.headers.get("Content-Length"))
+            DOWNLOAD_SERVER.update_progress(session, 0, total)
+
+            with open(tmp_path, "wb") as f:
+                async for chunk in resp.content.iter_chunked(CHUNK_SIZE):
+                    # Cancellation check between chunks. Cheap and means
+                    # cancellation latency is bounded by one chunk plus
+                    # one ``write()`` — typically well under a second
+                    # even on slow disks.
+                    if not DOWNLOAD_SERVER.is_active(session):
+                        raise DownloadCancelled()
+                    f.write(chunk)
+                    bytes_seen += len(chunk)
+                    DOWNLOAD_SERVER.update_progress(session, bytes_seen, total)
+
+        # Final cancellation check before we promote the .tmp to the real
+        # filename — avoids the awkward case where cancel arrives during
+        # the very last chunk and we'd otherwise commit anyway.
+        if not DOWNLOAD_SERVER.is_active(session):
+            raise DownloadCancelled()
+
+        # Size verification before commit. aiohttp already raises
+        # ClientPayloadError on a truncated Content-Length/chunked body,
+        # but this also catches the HTTP/1.0-style case (no Content-Length
+        # + Connection: close) where a short read can masquerade as a
+        # complete download.
+        if total is not None and bytes_seen != total:
+            raise DownloadError(
+                f"size mismatch for {session.model_id}: "
+                f"got {bytes_seen} of {total} bytes from {session.url}"
+            )
+
+        # Atomic rename. os.replace is atomic within the same filesystem,
+        # which is guaranteed here because tmp lives alongside final_path.
+        os.replace(tmp_path, final_path)
+        logging.info(
+            "[model_downloader] downloaded %s (%d bytes) from %s",
+            session.model_id, bytes_seen, session.url,
+        )
+        return final_path
+
+    except DownloadCancelled:
+        logging.info("[model_downloader] cancelled: %s", session.model_id)
+        _remove_if_exists(tmp_path)
+        raise
+    except Exception as e:
+        logging.warning(
+            "[model_downloader] failed: %s from %s: %s: %s",
+            session.model_id, session.url, type(e).__name__, e,
+            exc_info=True,
+        )
+        _remove_if_exists(tmp_path)
+        raise
+    finally:
+        # In all terminal states (success / cancel / error) drop the
+        # session from the registry. Idempotent — only removes if we're
+        # still the live epoch for this model_id.
+        DOWNLOAD_SERVER.finish(session)
+
+
+class DownloadError(Exception):
+    """Network / protocol error during a download."""
+
+    def __init__(self, message: str, status: Optional[int] = None) -> None:
+        super().__init__(message)
+        self.status = status
+
+
+async def _read_short(resp: aiohttp.ClientResponse, limit: int = 512) -> str:
+    """Read up to ``limit`` bytes of a response body for logging.
+
+    Used to surface the JSON/HTML reason from an HF non-2xx response in
+    server logs instead of just the status code. Best-effort: any
+    error here is swallowed.
+    """
+    try:
+        raw = await resp.content.read(limit)
+        return raw.decode("utf-8", errors="replace").strip()
+    except Exception:
+        return "<unreadable>"
+
+
+def _auth_headers_for(url: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Return any auth headers we should add to the GET for ``url``.
+
+    For HuggingFace URLs we inject the user's OAuth access token as a
+    Bearer header — this is HF's documented way to access gated repos
+    (see ``huggingface_hub.hf_hub_download``'s wire format). For every
+    other host we send no extra headers; allowlisted public files
+    don't need them and we don't want to leak tokens to other hosts.
+    """
+    if not is_hf_url(url):
+        return {}
+    tok = HF_AUTH_STORE.get_token_sync()
+    if tok is None or not tok.access_token:
+        return {}
+    return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {tok.access_token}"}
+
+
+def _remove_if_exists(path: str) -> None:
+    try:
+        os.remove(path)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        pass
+    except OSError as e:
+        logging.warning("[model_downloader] could not remove %s: %s", path, e)
+
+
+async def run_batch_sequential(sessions: list[DownloadSession]) -> None:
+    """Run a list of sessions one after the other.
+
+    Each session is independent: a failure or cancellation of one does
+    not abort the rest. Cancellations are observable via the registry
+    *before* a given download starts, so a session that's been
+    pre-cancelled (cancel before the worker reached it) just gets skipped.
+    """
+    for session in sessions:
+        # If the session got cancelled before its turn, skip without
+        # touching disk. This is what makes the per-request "sequential
+        # but cancellable" semantic work.
+        if not DOWNLOAD_SERVER.is_active(session):
+            DOWNLOAD_SERVER.finish(session)
+            continue
+        try:
+            await stream_to_disk(session)
+        except DownloadCancelled:
+            # Already logged + tmp removed inside stream_to_disk.
+            continue
+        except Exception:
+            # stream_to_disk already logged. Continue with the rest of the batch.
+            continue
+
+
+def schedule_batch(sessions: list[DownloadSession]) -> asyncio.Task:
+    """Kick off ``run_batch_sequential`` on the running event loop.
+
+    Returned task is fire-and-forget; the API handler returns immediately
+    after scheduling and clients observe progress via the polling endpoints.
+    """
+    return asyncio.create_task(run_batch_sequential(sessions))

app/model_downloader/gated_detection.py

@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+"""Per-URL probes for the unified availability endpoint.
+
+Three cached/derived facts per URL:
+
+  - ``is_gated``         intrinsic to the model; cached forever once known.
+                         Determined by ``auth_check(repo_id, token=None)``:
+                         ``GatedRepoError`` → True, success → False.
+
+  - ``is_hf_downloadable`` depends on the *current* token; recomputed every
+                         call. For non-gated URLs this is trivially True
+                         (no HF call needed). For gated URLs we run
+                         ``auth_check`` with the stored token each call.
+
+  - ``file_size``        intrinsic to the file. Cached forever once
+                         determined (including ``None`` on transient
+                         failure — we don't retry). We only attempt the
+                         HEAD when we already know the URL is downloadable
+                         to us; that way a failed-because-gated probe
+                         never lands as a cached ``None``.
+
+Caches are per-process, in-memory; small, no eviction needed for the
+workflow-scale (~tens of URLs). Concurrent calls for the same URL
+deduplicate via per-URL ``asyncio.Lock``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import logging
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Optional
+
+import aiohttp
+from huggingface_hub import HfApi
+from huggingface_hub.errors import (
+    GatedRepoError,
+    HfHubHTTPError,
+    RepositoryNotFoundError,
+)
+
+from app.model_downloader.allowlist import is_url_allowed
+from app.model_downloader.hf_auth.auth_store import HF_AUTH_STORE
+from app.model_downloader.hf_url import is_hf_url, repo_id_from_url
+from app.model_downloader.http_client import get_session, parse_content_length
+
+
+_HEAD_TIMEOUT = aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=15)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class ProbeResult:
+    file_size: Optional[int]
+    is_hf_downloadable: Optional[bool]
+
+
+# --- caches -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+# url → bool. Whether this URL's HF repo gates access. Intrinsic to the
+# model — never changes for a given URL.
+_is_gated_cache: dict[str, bool] = {}
+
+# url → Optional[int]. The file's size in bytes, ``None`` if a probe
+# was attempted and produced no answer. **Only populated when we knew
+# the URL was downloadable to us at probe time** — so gated-without-
+# access never lands a ``None`` here that we'd be stuck with after login.
+_file_size_cache: dict[str, Optional[int]] = {}
+
+# Per-URL locks for single-flight probes — when multiple polls arrive
+# in the same tick for the same URL, exactly one of them runs the HF
+# call and the others wait on the result.
+_locks: dict[str, asyncio.Lock] = {}
+
+
+def _lock_for(url: str) -> asyncio.Lock:
+    lock = _locks.get(url)
+    if lock is None:
+        lock = asyncio.Lock()
+        _locks[url] = lock
+    return lock
+
+
+def clear_caches_for_tests() -> None:
+    """Test-only: drop everything."""
+    _is_gated_cache.clear()
+    _file_size_cache.clear()
+    _locks.clear()
+
+
+# --- public entrypoint --------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+async def probe_url(url: str) -> ProbeResult:
+    """Return downloadability + size for one URL, using caches where safe."""
+    if not is_url_allowed(url):
+        return ProbeResult(file_size=None, is_hf_downloadable=None)
+    if not is_hf_url(url):
+        # Non-HF: ``is_hf_downloadable`` is "not applicable" (None).
+        # Size we still cache so we don't HEAD on every poll.
+        size = await _get_or_probe_size(url, token=None)
+        return ProbeResult(file_size=size, is_hf_downloadable=None)
+
+    repo_id = repo_id_from_url(url)
+    if repo_id is None:
+        return ProbeResult(file_size=None, is_hf_downloadable=None)
+
+    # Determine intrinsic gating once.
+    gated = await _resolve_is_gated(url, repo_id)
+    if gated is None:
+        return ProbeResult(file_size=None, is_hf_downloadable=None)
+
+    # Compute current-token downloadability per call.
+    tok = await HF_AUTH_STORE.get_valid_token()
+    token_str: Optional[str] = tok.access_token if tok else None
+    if not gated:
+        is_hf_downloadable: Optional[bool] = True
+    else:
+        is_hf_downloadable = await _auth_check_with_token(repo_id, token_str)
+
+    if is_hf_downloadable is True:
+        size = await _get_or_probe_size(url, token=token_str)
+    else:
+        # Skip the HEAD entirely — would 401 and we'd be stuck with
+        # cached None that survives a later login.
+        size = None
+
+    return ProbeResult(file_size=size, is_hf_downloadable=is_hf_downloadable)
+
+
+# --- gated/auth probes --------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+async def _resolve_is_gated(url: str, repo_id: str) -> Optional[bool]:
+    """Decide once whether ``repo_id`` is a gated repo."""
+    cached = _is_gated_cache.get(url)
+    if cached is not None:
+        return cached
+
+    async with _lock_for(url):
+        cached = _is_gated_cache.get(url)
+        if cached is not None:
+            return cached
+        # Probe anonymously (token=None) on purpose: an unauthenticated
+        # auth_check is what makes HF raise GatedRepoError for gated repos.
+        # With a token, a gated-but-accepted repo would succeed and look
+        # ungated.
+        try:
+            await asyncio.to_thread(_auth_check_sync, repo_id, None)
+            _is_gated_cache[url] = False
+            return False
+        except GatedRepoError:
+            _is_gated_cache[url] = True
+            return True
+        except RepositoryNotFoundError:
+            # Repo doesn't exist publicly. Treat as gated — we can't
+            # serve it without auth, and an authenticated check might
+            # still succeed if it's a private repo the user can see.
+            _is_gated_cache[url] = True
+            return True
+        except (HfHubHTTPError, Exception) as e:
+            logging.debug(
+                "[hf_auth] is_gated probe failed for %s (will retry): %s",
+                repo_id, e,
+            )
+            return None  # don't cache; retry next call
+
+
+async def _auth_check_with_token(
+    repo_id: str, token: Optional[str]
+) -> Optional[bool]:
+    """Auth-check with the supplied token. True/False/None per outcome."""
+    try:
+        await asyncio.to_thread(_auth_check_sync, repo_id, token)
+        return True
+    except GatedRepoError:
+        return False
+    except RepositoryNotFoundError:
+        return False
+    except HfHubHTTPError as e:
+        # 401/403 covers org-SSO-required, revoked tokens, and similar —
+        # all of which mean "can't fetch right now" from the user's POV.
+        status = getattr(getattr(e, "response", None), "status_code", None)
+        if status in (401, 403):
+            return False
+        logging.debug(
+            "[hf_auth] auth_check transient failure for %s: %s", repo_id, e,
+        )
+        return None
+    except Exception as e:
+        logging.warning("[hf_auth] unexpected auth_check error for %s: %s", repo_id, e)
+        return None
+
+
+def _auth_check_sync(repo_id: str, token: Optional[str]) -> None:
+    """Thin sync wrapper around ``HfApi.auth_check`` for ``asyncio.to_thread``."""
+    HfApi().auth_check(repo_id, token=token)
+
+
+# --- size probe ---------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+async def _get_or_probe_size(url: str, token: Optional[str]) -> Optional[int]:
+    """Return the cached size or HEAD the URL once and cache the result."""
+    if url in _file_size_cache:
+        return _file_size_cache[url]
+
+    async with _lock_for(url):
+        if url in _file_size_cache:
+            return _file_size_cache[url]
+        size = await _probe_size_once(url, token=token)
+        _file_size_cache[url] = size
+        return size
+
+
+async def _probe_size_once(url: str, token: Optional[str]) -> Optional[int]:
+    """HEAD the URL and return the file size in bytes, or None on failure.
+
+    HuggingFace serves LFS-tracked files via a 302 to a signed CDN URL.
+    The real file size lives in the non-standard ``X-Linked-Size`` header
+    on that 302 response (``Content-Length`` is the redirect-body length).
+    Disabling redirect-follow lets us read either header on the same
+    response:
+
+      - LFS files: 302 + ``X-Linked-Size``
+      - Small/non-LFS files: 200 + ``Content-Length``
+    """
+    headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"} if token else {}
+    try:
+        session = await get_session()
+        async with session.head(
+            url, allow_redirects=False, timeout=_HEAD_TIMEOUT, headers=headers,
+        ) as resp:
+            linked = parse_content_length(resp.headers.get("X-Linked-Size"))
+            if linked is not None:
+                return linked
+            if resp.status == 200:
+                return parse_content_length(resp.headers.get("Content-Length"))
+            return None
+    except (aiohttp.ClientError, TimeoutError, OSError):
+        return None
+
+
+# Backward-compat shim so consumers that still import the old name keep
+# building during the refactor; can be removed once routes are updated.
+MetadataProbeResult = ProbeResult

app/model_downloader/hf_auth/auth_store.py

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+"""In-memory token cache with lazy disk persistence + refresh.
+
+Public surface is the ``HF_AUTH_STORE`` singleton. Callers ask
+``get_valid_token()``; the store transparently refreshes from disk
+on first use, refreshes via the OAuth refresh_token if the cached
+access_token is expired, and returns ``None`` if neither path works.
+
+The refresh path imports ``oauth.refresh_access_token`` lazily to
+avoid an import cycle (oauth needs the store to save tokens it
+acquires).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+import threading
+from typing import Optional
+
+from app.model_downloader.hf_auth.token_store import (
+    Token,
+    delete_token,
+    load_token,
+    save_token,
+)
+
+
+class HfAuthStore:
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+        self._token: Optional[Token] = None
+        self._loaded_from_disk = False
+
+    def _ensure_loaded(self) -> None:
+        """Read the disk token into memory on first access."""
+        if self._loaded_from_disk:
+            return
+        with self._lock:
+            if self._loaded_from_disk:
+                return
+            self._token = load_token()
+            self._loaded_from_disk = True
+
+    def has_token(self) -> bool:
+        """Cheap check: is there any token in memory?
+
+        Does not attempt refresh; an expired-but-refreshable token still
+        counts as "logged in" from the user's perspective.
+        """
+        self._ensure_loaded()
+        return self._token is not None
+
+    def _store_token_locked(self, token: Token) -> None:
+        """Set the in-memory token and persist it to disk.
+
+        Caller must already hold ``self._lock``. Keeping the disk write inside
+        the lock means memory and disk flip together — a concurrent ``clear()``
+        or refresh can't interleave between them.
+        """
+        self._token = token
+        self._loaded_from_disk = True
+        save_token(token)
+
+    def set_token(self, token: Token) -> None:
+        """Replace the in-memory token and persist to disk (atomically)."""
+        with self._lock:
+            self._store_token_locked(token)
+
+    def clear(self) -> None:
+        """Forget the token in memory and on disk (logout)."""
+        with self._lock:
+            self._token = None
+            self._loaded_from_disk = True
+            delete_token()
+
+    def get_token_sync(self) -> Optional[Token]:
+        """Return the cached token without refreshing.
+
+        Sync callers (e.g. constructing an Authorization header in a
+        non-async path) use this. They accept an expired token over
+        ``None``; HF will simply return 401 and the caller can decide
+        what to do.
+        """
+        self._ensure_loaded()
+        return self._token
+
+    async def get_valid_token(self) -> Optional[Token]:
+        """Return a fresh token, refreshing via OAuth if necessary.
+
+        Returns ``None`` if there's no cached token at all, or if the
+        cached token is expired and refresh failed. Callers should
+        treat that as "user is not logged in".
+        """
+        self._ensure_loaded()
+        with self._lock:
+            tok = self._token
+        if tok is None:
+            return None
+        if tok.is_valid():
+            return tok
+        if not tok.refresh_token:
+            return None
+
+        # Lazy import to avoid the oauth ↔ store import cycle.
+        from app.model_downloader.hf_auth.oauth import refresh_access_token
+
+        try:
+            refreshed = await refresh_access_token(tok.refresh_token)
+        except Exception as e:
+            logging.warning("[hf_auth] token refresh failed: %s", e)
+            return None
+
+        with self._lock:
+            # If a logout (clear) or another update replaced the token while we
+            # were awaiting the refresh, don't resurrect the old session.
+            if self._token is not tok:
+                return None
+            self._store_token_locked(refreshed)
+        return refreshed
+
+
+HF_AUTH_STORE = HfAuthStore()

app/model_downloader/hf_auth/eligibility.py

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+"""Whether this deployment is allowed to do interactive HF OAuth.
+
+We only let the server hold a HuggingFace token under a strict trust
+assumption: this is a *single tenant local* install. Concretely:
+
+  - The server is bound to a loopback address. SSH tunneling /
+    reverse-proxies can defeat this, but it's the strongest signal
+    we have without an authentication system.
+  - ``--multi-user`` is off. A shared token used implicitly by multiple
+    declared users would be a footgun — one user's gated downloads
+    would silently authenticate as another.
+
+Anything else and the frontend hides the HF login UI entirely; gated
+models continue to show the "acquire it manually" message.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ipaddress
+import socket
+
+from comfy.cli_args import args
+
+
+def _is_loopback(host: str | None) -> bool:
+    """Duplicates ``server.is_loopback`` (small, no shared module yet).
+
+    Resolves a host or IP literal to whether it lives on the loopback
+    interface (127.0.0.0/8 for IPv4, ::1 for IPv6). Returns False for
+    ``0.0.0.0`` / ``::`` because those are bind-all wildcards, not
+    loopback.
+    """
+    if host is None:
+        return False
+    try:
+        return ipaddress.ip_address(host).is_loopback
+    except ValueError:
+        pass
+
+    loopback = False
+    for family in (socket.AF_INET, socket.AF_INET6):
+        try:
+            r = socket.getaddrinfo(host, None, family, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+            for _family, _, _, _, sockaddr in r:
+                if not ipaddress.ip_address(sockaddr[0]).is_loopback:
+                    return loopback
+                loopback = True
+        except socket.gaierror:
+            pass
+    return loopback
+
+
+def is_hf_auth_eligible() -> bool:
+    """True iff this deployment may surface the HF OAuth flow."""
+    return _is_loopback(args.listen) and not args.multi_user

app/model_downloader/hf_auth/oauth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
+"""OAuth 2.0 PKCE flow against HuggingFace's authorization server.
+
+Wired so that ``POST /api/hf-auth-login-start`` can:
+  1. Generate state + PKCE verifier/challenge in this process.
+  2. Spin up a short-lived loopback HTTP server at port 41954 to
+     receive the redirect callback from HF.
+  3. Return the ``authorize_url`` for the frontend to open in a new tab.
+
+After the user grants consent on huggingface.co, HF redirects to the
+local callback URL with ``code`` and ``state``. The callback server
+validates ``state`` (CSRF), exchanges the code for tokens via PKCE,
+hands the resulting Token to ``HF_AUTH_STORE.set_token``, and shuts
+itself down.
+
+Before this can be exercised end-to-end a maintainer must register a
+HuggingFace OAuth app and substitute the ``HF_CLIENT_ID`` placeholder
+below. See the comment above the constant for the exact steps.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import logging
+import secrets
+import threading
+import time
+
+import aiohttp
+from aiohttp import web
+
+from app.model_downloader.hf_auth.auth_store import HF_AUTH_STORE
+from app.model_downloader.hf_auth.token_store import Token
+from app.model_downloader.http_client import get_session
+
+
+# --- HF OAuth app registration -------------------------------------------- #
+# NOTE: The OAuth client_id below is a placeholder. Before this feature can be
+# exercised end-to-end, a maintainer must register a HuggingFace OAuth app
+# under a Comfy-Org-controlled HF account and substitute its client_id here.
+# Detailed walkthrough is in docs/server-side-model-downloads-handover.html
+# ("HuggingFace OAuth app setup" section). Short version:
+#   1. huggingface.co → Settings → Connected Apps → "Create app"
+#   2. Default Scopes: check ``openid`` + ``profile`` (User Info) and
+#      ``gated-repos`` (Repository Access). Leave everything else off.
+#   3. Redirect URLs: exactly ``http://127.0.0.1:41954/api/auth/huggingface/callback``
+#      — must match ``REDIRECT_URI`` below; change both in lockstep if you
+#      change ``CALLBACK_PORT``.
+#   4. Save → copy the resulting Client ID into ``HF_CLIENT_ID`` below.
+# The client_id is not a secret (it travels through the user's browser in
+# plaintext); HF's "Public app" type means there's no client secret to
+# manage — PKCE replaces it.
+HF_CLIENT_ID = "REPLACE_ME_WITH_COMFY_ORG_HF_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID"
+
+CALLBACK_HOST = "127.0.0.1"
+CALLBACK_PORT = 41954
+CALLBACK_PATH = "/api/auth/huggingface/callback"
+REDIRECT_URI = f"http://{CALLBACK_HOST}:{CALLBACK_PORT}{CALLBACK_PATH}"
+
+AUTHORIZE_URL = "https://huggingface.co/oauth/authorize"
+TOKEN_URL = "https://huggingface.co/oauth/token"
+_TOKEN_REQUEST_TIMEOUT = aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=30)
+# Minimal scope set for the feature:
+#   - openid       : required by HF when the app uses OIDC at all
+#   - profile      : lets ``HfApi.whoami(token=...)`` return a username for the
+#                    settings UI; cosmetic but expected
+#   - gated-repos  : grants the token enough to call ``auth_check`` and
+#                    download files from public gated repos the user has
+#                    accepted the license for. The wider ``read-repos`` scope
+#                    would also work (it includes ``gated-repos``) but it
+#                    additionally grants private-repo read access, which we
+#                    don't need and which makes the consent screen scarier
+#                    for the user.
+SCOPE = "openid profile gated-repos"
+
+# Maximum time the callback server stays up waiting for the user to
+# complete consent on huggingface.co. Past this, the port closes and
+# the user has to click "Log in" again.
+CALLBACK_TIMEOUT_SECS = 300
+
+
+# Process-wide lock so two simultaneous /api/hf-auth-login-start
+# requests don't fight over port CALLBACK_PORT.
+_OAUTH_LOCK = threading.Lock()
+
+
+class OAuthInProgressError(Exception):
+    """Another OAuth attempt is already running."""
+
+
+class OAuthCallbackError(Exception):
+    """The OAuth callback returned an error (HF denied, port stolen, etc.)."""
+
+
+# --- PKCE primitives ------------------------------------------------------ #
+
+
+def _make_pkce() -> tuple[str, str, str]:
+    """Return ``(verifier, challenge, state)``.
+
+    Verifier never leaves this process. Challenge and state travel
+    through the user's browser. State is checked on the callback to
+    prevent a malicious cross-origin redirect from injecting a token.
+    """
+    verifier = secrets.token_urlsafe(64)
+    challenge = (
+        base64.urlsafe_b64encode(hashlib.sha256(verifier.encode("ascii")).digest())
+        .rstrip(b"=")
+        .decode("ascii")
+    )
+    state = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+    return verifier, challenge, state
+
+
+def _build_authorize_url(challenge: str, state: str) -> str:
+    from urllib.parse import urlencode
+
+    params = {
+        "client_id": HF_CLIENT_ID,
+        "redirect_uri": REDIRECT_URI,
+        "response_type": "code",
+        "scope": SCOPE,
+        "state": state,
+        "code_challenge": challenge,
+        "code_challenge_method": "S256",
+    }
+    return f"{AUTHORIZE_URL}?{urlencode(params)}"
+
+
+# --- Token exchange ------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+async def _exchange_code(code: str, verifier: str) -> Token:
+    """Trade the authorization code for an access+refresh token pair."""
+    data = {
+        "grant_type": "authorization_code",
+        "code": code,
+        "redirect_uri": REDIRECT_URI,
+        "client_id": HF_CLIENT_ID,
+        "code_verifier": verifier,
+    }
+    session = await get_session()
+    async with session.post(TOKEN_URL, data=data, timeout=_TOKEN_REQUEST_TIMEOUT) as resp:
+        resp.raise_for_status()
+        body = await resp.json()
+    return Token(
+        access_token=body["access_token"],
+        refresh_token=body.get("refresh_token"),
+        expires_at=time.time() + float(body.get("expires_in", 3600)),
+        scope=body.get("scope", SCOPE),
+    )
+
+
+async def refresh_access_token(refresh_token: str) -> Token:
+    """Trade a refresh_token for a new access (+ possibly refresh) token."""
+    data = {
+        "grant_type": "refresh_token",
+        "refresh_token": refresh_token,
+        "client_id": HF_CLIENT_ID,
+    }
+    session = await get_session()
+    async with session.post(TOKEN_URL, data=data, timeout=_TOKEN_REQUEST_TIMEOUT) as resp:
+        resp.raise_for_status()
+        body = await resp.json()
+    return Token(
+        access_token=body["access_token"],
+        # If HF doesn't rotate refresh tokens, keep using the existing one.
+        refresh_token=body.get("refresh_token", refresh_token),
+        expires_at=time.time() + float(body.get("expires_in", 3600)),
+        scope=body.get("scope", SCOPE),
+    )
+
+
+# --- Callback server ------------------------------------------------------ #
+
+
+async def start_login_flow() -> str:
+    """Begin one OAuth attempt: spawn the callback server, return the URL.
+
+    Returns the URL the frontend should open in a new tab. Raises
+    ``OAuthInProgressError`` if another attempt is already running.
+    The callback server runs in the background until the user
+    completes consent or until ``CALLBACK_TIMEOUT_SECS`` elapses;
+    either way the lock + port are released afterward.
+    """
+    if not _OAUTH_LOCK.acquire(blocking=False):
+        raise OAuthInProgressError()
+
+    try:
+        verifier, challenge, state = _make_pkce()
+        authorize_url = _build_authorize_url(challenge, state)
+        ready: asyncio.Future[None] = asyncio.get_event_loop().create_future()
+    except BaseException:
+        # Failed before handing the lock to the callback-server task: release it
+        # here. (Once the task is spawned, it owns releasing the lock.)
+        _OAUTH_LOCK.release()
+        raise
+
+    asyncio.create_task(_run_callback_server(verifier, state, ready))
+    # Don't return the URL until the callback server is actually bound and
+    # listening — otherwise HF could redirect to a port nothing is serving and
+    # the login would silently dead-end. ``ready`` raises if the bind failed.
+    await ready
+    return authorize_url
+
+
+async def _run_callback_server(
+    verifier: str, expected_state: str, ready: "asyncio.Future[None]"
+) -> None:
+    """Listen for HF's redirect once, capture the token, then shut down.
+
+    Signals ``ready`` once the port is bound (or with an exception if the bind
+    fails), so ``start_login_flow`` only hands back a URL on a live server.
+    """
+    received: asyncio.Future[Token] = asyncio.get_event_loop().create_future()
+
+    async def handler(request: web.Request) -> web.Response:
+        try:
+            if request.query.get("state") != expected_state:
+                return web.Response(status=400, text="state mismatch")
+            err = request.query.get("error")
+            if err:
+                received.set_exception(OAuthCallbackError(f"HF returned: {err}"))
+                return web.Response(status=400, text=f"OAuth error: {err}")
+            code = request.query.get("code")
+            if not code:
+                return web.Response(status=400, text="missing code")
+            tok = await _exchange_code(code, verifier)
+            if not received.done():
+                received.set_result(tok)
+            return web.Response(
+                content_type="text/html",
+                text=(
+                    "<html><body style='font-family:sans-serif;padding:40px'>"
+                    "<h2>HuggingFace login successful</h2>"
+                    "<p>You can close this tab and return to ComfyUI.</p>"
+                    "</body></html>"
+                ),
+            )
+        except Exception as exc:
+            if not received.done():
+                received.set_exception(exc)
+            return web.Response(status=500, text=str(exc))
+
+    app = web.Application()
+    app.router.add_get(CALLBACK_PATH, handler)
+    runner = web.AppRunner(app)
+    try:
+        await runner.setup()
+        site = web.TCPSite(runner, CALLBACK_HOST, CALLBACK_PORT, reuse_address=True)
+        await site.start()
+    except Exception as e:
+        # Couldn't bind the callback port (commonly already in use). Tell the
+        # waiting start_login_flow via ``ready`` so it surfaces a clear error
+        # instead of returning a dead URL, and release the lock for next time.
+        logging.warning("[hf_auth] could not start callback server: %s", e)
+        if not ready.done():
+            ready.set_exception(
+                OAuthCallbackError(f"could not bind callback port {CALLBACK_PORT}: {e}")
+            )
+        _OAUTH_LOCK.release()
+        return
+
+    # Bound and listening — now it's safe for start_login_flow to return the URL.
+    if not ready.done():
+        ready.set_result(None)
+
+    try:
+        token = await asyncio.wait_for(received, timeout=CALLBACK_TIMEOUT_SECS)
+    except asyncio.TimeoutError:
+        logging.info("[hf_auth] OAuth login timed out after %ds", CALLBACK_TIMEOUT_SECS)
+        return
+    except OAuthCallbackError as e:
+        logging.warning("[hf_auth] OAuth callback error: %s", e)
+        return
+    except Exception as e:
+        logging.warning("[hf_auth] unexpected OAuth failure: %s", e)
+        return
+    else:
+        HF_AUTH_STORE.set_token(token)
+        logging.info("[hf_auth] OAuth login complete")
+    finally:
+        await runner.cleanup()
+        if _OAUTH_LOCK.locked():
+            _OAUTH_LOCK.release()
+
+
+def is_login_in_progress() -> bool:
+    """True iff a callback server is currently bound + waiting."""
+    return _OAUTH_LOCK.locked()
+
+
+# Re-export for callers that only want the URL builder (e.g. tests).
+__all__ = [
+    "start_login_flow",
+    "refresh_access_token",
+    "is_login_in_progress",
+    "OAuthInProgressError",
+    "CALLBACK_TIMEOUT_SECS",
+]

app/model_downloader/hf_auth/token_store.py

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+"""On-disk persistence for the HuggingFace OAuth token.
+
+The token shape mirrors what HF returns on the token exchange: an
+``access_token``, an optional ``refresh_token``, the absolute epoch at
+which the access token expires, and the granted scope. We persist
+this so logging in once survives ComfyUI restarts under the internal
+``__hf_auth`` system-user directory; the file is mode ``0600`` so only
+the OS user can read it.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import logging
+import os
+import stat
+import time
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+from typing import Optional
+
+import folder_paths
+
+
+# Treat a token as expired this many seconds before its server-reported
+# ``expires_at`` so we don't try to use a token mid-request only for it
+# to flip stale between auth_check and the actual GET.
+EXPIRY_BUFFER_SECS = 60
+
+TOKEN_FILENAME = "hf_auth_token.json"
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Token:
+    """One OAuth token + the metadata we need to use it."""
+    access_token: str
+    refresh_token: Optional[str]
+    expires_at: float  # absolute epoch seconds
+    scope: str = ""
+
+    def is_valid(self) -> bool:
+        """True iff we can use this token right now."""
+        return (
+            bool(self.access_token)
+            and (self.expires_at - time.time() > EXPIRY_BUFFER_SECS)
+        )
+
+
+def _token_dir() -> str:
+    return folder_paths.get_system_user_directory("hf_auth")
+
+
+def _token_path() -> str:
+    return os.path.join(_token_dir(), TOKEN_FILENAME)
+
+
+def load_token() -> Optional[Token]:
+    """Read the persisted token, returning ``None`` if absent or corrupt."""
+    path = _token_path()
+    if not os.path.exists(path):
+        return None
+    try:
+        with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
+            data = json.load(f)
+        return Token(**data)
+    except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError) as e:
+        logging.warning("[hf_auth] could not load token at %s: %s", path, e)
+        return None
+
+
+def save_token(token: Token) -> None:
+    """Atomically write the token with 0600 permissions."""
+    path = _token_path()
+    os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path), exist_ok=True)
+    tmp = path + ".tmp"
+    fd = os.open(tmp, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC, 0o600)
+    with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
+        json.dump(asdict(token), f)
+    os.replace(tmp, path)
+    try:
+        os.chmod(path, stat.S_IRUSR | stat.S_IWUSR)
+    except OSError as e:
+        # On Windows / weird filesystems chmod may be a no-op; not fatal.
+        logging.debug("[hf_auth] chmod 0600 on %s failed: %s", path, e)
+
+
+def delete_token() -> None:
+    """Remove the persisted token; no-op if it doesn't exist."""
+    path = _token_path()
+    try:
+        os.remove(path)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        pass
+    except OSError as e:
+        logging.warning("[hf_auth] could not remove token at %s: %s", path, e)

app/model_downloader/hf_url.py

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+"""Parsers for the ``huggingface.co`` URL shape we accept in workflows.
+
+The download API accepts URLs of the form
+``https://huggingface.co/<org>/<repo>/resolve/<rev>/<path/to/file>``.
+We need to recover ``<org>/<repo>`` (the *repo_id*) from such URLs for
+``huggingface_hub`` API calls (notably ``HfApi.auth_check``).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Optional
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+_HF_HOST = "huggingface.co"
+
+
+def is_hf_url(url: str) -> bool:
+    """Cheap host check — does this URL point at huggingface.co?"""
+    try:
+        return urlparse(url).hostname == _HF_HOST
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+
+
+def repo_id_from_url(url: str) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Extract ``<org>/<repo>`` from an HF model file URL.
+
+    Returns ``None`` if the URL isn't on huggingface.co or doesn't look
+    like a model-file URL. The expected shape is
+    ``/<org>/<repo>/resolve/<rev>/<path>`` — anything else
+    (datasets, spaces, /tree/, /blob/, …) we treat as out of scope here.
+    """
+    if not is_hf_url(url):
+        return None
+    parts = urlparse(url).path.lstrip("/").split("/")
+    if len(parts) < 4 or parts[2] != "resolve":
+        return None
+    org, repo = parts[0], parts[1]
+    if not org or not repo:
+        return None
+    return f"{org}/{repo}"

app/model_downloader/http_client.py

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+"""Lazy module-level aiohttp ClientSession.
+
+A single shared session means TLS handshakes are reused across HEAD probes
+and the subsequent GETs to the same host (HuggingFace is the dominant
+case), which is a noticeable speedup on cold connections.
+
+We deliberately don't close the session at process exit — aiohttp's
+warning about unclosed sessions is benign at shutdown, and adding atexit
+plumbing buys nothing because the OS reclaims the sockets anyway. The
+session lifetime is the lifetime of the Python process.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import ssl
+from typing import Optional
+
+import aiohttp
+import certifi
+
+
+# Larger per-host pool than aiohttp's default (=100 total / =0 per host)
+# so concurrent gated probes + a download to the same host don't queue.
+_CONNECTOR_LIMIT_PER_HOST = 8
+
+_session: Optional[aiohttp.ClientSession] = None
+_lock = asyncio.Lock()
+
+
+def ssl_context() -> ssl.SSLContext:
+    """TLS context pinned to certifi's CA bundle.
+    aiohttp's default context uses the OS trust store, which isn't wired up
+    on some Python installs (python.org macOS, slim containers) — there TLS
+    to huggingface.co fails with CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED.
+    """
+    return ssl.create_default_context(cafile=certifi.where())
+
+
+async def get_session() -> aiohttp.ClientSession:
+    """Return the shared session, creating it on first call."""
+    global _session
+    if _session is not None and not _session.closed:
+        return _session
+    async with _lock:
+        if _session is None or _session.closed:
+            connector = aiohttp.TCPConnector(
+                limit_per_host=_CONNECTOR_LIMIT_PER_HOST,
+                ssl=ssl_context(),
+            )
+            _session = aiohttp.ClientSession(connector=connector)
+    return _session
+
+
+def parse_content_length(value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[int]:
+    """Parse a byte-count header value, or None if absent/malformed/negative."""
+    if not value:
+        return None
+    try:
+        n = int(value)
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+    return n if n >= 0 else None

app/model_downloader/paths.py

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+"""Path resolution for model downloads.
+
+Model identifiers used across the download API are *relative destination
+paths* of the form ``<directory>/<filename>`` (e.g. ``loras/my_lora.safetensors``).
+This module turns one of those identifiers into an absolute on-disk path
+under one of ComfyUI's registered model folders, while rejecting unknown
+folders, path traversal, and other ill-formed inputs.
+"""
+
+import os
+import re
+from typing import Optional, Tuple
+
+import folder_paths
+
+
+# Constrain components so a model_id can never escape its target directory.
+# - directory: a single path segment of safe chars
+# - filename: a single path segment of safe chars, must end with a model extension
+_SEGMENT_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$")
+
+# Destination filename must name a model file (same set as the URL allowlist),
+# so a download can't land as e.g. ``foo.txt`` that ComfyUI won't recognise.
+_MODEL_EXTENSIONS = (".safetensors", ".sft", ".ckpt", ".pth", ".pt")
+
+# Distinctive temp suffix so the startup orphan-sweep only removes files THIS
+# subsystem created — never unrelated ``*.tmp`` files in the model dirs.
+_TMP_SUFFIX = ".comfy-download.tmp"
+
+
+class InvalidModelId(ValueError):
+    """Raised when a model_id is syntactically invalid or refers to an
+    unknown model folder."""
+
+
+def parse_model_id(model_id: str) -> Tuple[str, str]:
+    """Split ``<directory>/<filename>`` and validate both components.
+
+    Returns ``(directory, filename)``. Raises ``InvalidModelId`` on
+    malformed input. Does NOT touch the filesystem.
+    """
+    if not isinstance(model_id, str) or "/" not in model_id:
+        raise InvalidModelId(f"model_id must be '<directory>/<filename>', got {model_id!r}")
+    directory, _, filename = model_id.partition("/")
+    if "/" in filename or not directory or not filename:
+        raise InvalidModelId(f"model_id must be exactly one '/' separator, got {model_id!r}")
+    if not _SEGMENT_RE.match(directory):
+        raise InvalidModelId(f"invalid directory segment {directory!r}")
+    if not _SEGMENT_RE.match(filename):
+        raise InvalidModelId(f"invalid filename segment {filename!r}")
+    if not filename.endswith(_MODEL_EXTENSIONS):
+        raise InvalidModelId(
+            f"filename must end with a model extension {_MODEL_EXTENSIONS}, got {filename!r}"
+        )
+    if directory not in folder_paths.folder_names_and_paths:
+        raise InvalidModelId(f"unknown model folder {directory!r}")
+    return directory, filename
+
+
+def resolve_existing(model_id: str) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Return the absolute path of an installed model, or None if missing.
+
+    Honours ``extra_model_paths.yaml`` transparently via
+    ``folder_paths.get_full_path``.
+    """
+    directory, filename = parse_model_id(model_id)
+    return folder_paths.get_full_path(directory, filename)
+
+
+def resolve_destination(model_id: str, epoch: int = 0) -> Tuple[str, str]:
+    """Return ``(final_path, tmp_path)`` for a download.
+
+    Downloads land at the first registered path for the model's directory
+    (the "primary" location). The temp sibling is the write target, atomically
+    renamed onto ``final_path`` on success.
+
+    ``tmp_path`` embeds the session ``epoch`` so a cancel+retry of the same
+    model never shares a temp path between the old (cancelling) worker and the
+    new attempt — otherwise the old worker's rollback could delete the new
+    worker's in-progress file. The distinctive suffix scopes the orphan sweep.
+    """
+    directory, filename = parse_model_id(model_id)
+    roots = folder_paths.get_folder_paths(directory)
+    if not roots:
+        raise InvalidModelId(f"no on-disk path registered for folder {directory!r}")
+    root = roots[0]
+    final_path = os.path.join(root, filename)
+    tmp_path = f"{final_path}.{epoch}{_TMP_SUFFIX}"
+    return final_path, tmp_path
+
+
+def iter_all_tmp_paths():
+    """Yield this subsystem's temp files under every registered model folder.
+
+    Matches only our distinctive ``_TMP_SUFFIX`` (not every ``*.tmp``) so the
+    startup orphan-sweep can't delete temp files created by other tools.
+    """
+    seen_roots: set[str] = set()
+    for directory in folder_paths.folder_names_and_paths.keys():
+        for root in folder_paths.get_folder_paths(directory):
+            if root in seen_roots or not os.path.isdir(root):
+                continue
+            seen_roots.add(root)
+            try:
+                for entry in os.scandir(root):
+                    if entry.is_file() and entry.name.endswith(_TMP_SUFFIX):
+                        yield entry.path
+            except OSError:
+                # Folder might be unreadable / missing on certain mounts —
+                # not fatal, just skip it.
+                continue

comfy_api/feature_flags.py

@@ -98,12 +98,24 @@ def _parse_cli_feature_flags() -> dict[str, Any]:
 
 
 # Default server capabilities
+def _hf_auth_eligible_at_startup() -> bool:
+    """Snapshot eligibility once at feature-flag init time.
+
+    Imports lazily because the flags module loads very early in the
+    server boot sequence — earlier than the model_downloader package.
+    """
+    from app.model_downloader.hf_auth.eligibility import is_hf_auth_eligible
+    return is_hf_auth_eligible()
+
+
 _CORE_FEATURE_FLAGS: dict[str, Any] = {
     "supports_preview_metadata": True,
     "max_upload_size": args.max_upload_size * 1024 * 1024, # Convert MB to bytes
     "extension": {"manager": {"supports_v4": True}},
     "node_replacements": True,
     "assets": args.enable_assets,
+    "server_side_model_downloads": True,
+    "hf_auth_eligible": _hf_auth_eligible_at_startup(),
 }
 
 # CLI-provided flags cannot overwrite core flags

openapi.yaml

@@ -188,6 +188,49 @@ components:
                 - id
                 - updated_at
             type: object
+        AvailabilityStatusRequest:
+            description: |
+                Models to query — each entry is `model_id → URL`. The URL lets
+                the server compute file_size + is_hf_downloadable on the same
+                request, eliminating the need for a separate metadata endpoint.
+            properties:
+                models:
+                    additionalProperties:
+                        type: string
+                    description: model_id → URL declared in the workflow.
+                    type: object
+            required:
+                - models
+            type: object
+        AvailabilityStatusResponse:
+            description: Per-model state + metadata + HF auth snapshot.
+            properties:
+                hf_auth:
+                    $ref: '#/components/schemas/HfAuthStatus'
+                models:
+                    additionalProperties:
+                        $ref: '#/components/schemas/ModelStatusEntry'
+                    type: object
+            required:
+                - models
+                - hf_auth
+            type: object
+        CancelDownloadSessionRequest:
+            description: Request to cancel an in-flight download for a given model_id.
+            properties:
+                model_id:
+                    type: string
+            required:
+                - model_id
+            type: object
+        CancelDownloadSessionResponse:
+            description: Result of a cancellation request.
+            properties:
+                cancelled:
+                    type: boolean
+            required:
+                - cancelled
+            type: object
         CreateWorkflowRequest:
             description: Request body for creating a new saved workflow.
             properties:
@@ -230,6 +273,51 @@ components:
                 - base_version
                 - workflow_json
             type: object
+        DownloadModelsRequest:
+            description: Map of model_id → URL of files to fetch into the model folders.
+            properties:
+                models:
+                    additionalProperties:
+                        type: string
+                    description: model_id → URL of models to download.
+                    type: object
+            required:
+                - models
+            type: object
+        DownloadModelsResponse:
+            description: Acknowledgement that downloads have been scheduled.
+            properties:
+                accepted:
+                    description: Always true; the request was scheduled.
+                    type: boolean
+                scheduled:
+                    description: The list of model_ids whose downloads are now in-flight.
+                    items:
+                        type: string
+                    type: array
+            required:
+                - accepted
+                - scheduled
+            type: object
+        DownloadProgress:
+            description: In-flight download progress; embedded in ModelStatusEntry.
+            properties:
+                bytes_downloaded:
+                    format: int64
+                    type: integer
+                progress:
+                    description: Fraction in [0,1]; null until total_bytes is known.
+                    format: float
+                    nullable: true
+                    type: number
+                total_bytes:
+                    description: Content-Length when supplied by the source.
+                    format: int64
+                    nullable: true
+                    type: integer
+            required:
+                - bytes_downloaded
+            type: object
         ErrorResponse:
             description: Standard error response with a machine-readable code and human-readable message.
             properties:
@@ -394,6 +482,46 @@ components:
                 - name
                 - info
             type: object
+        HfAuthLoginStartResponse:
+            description: URL the frontend should open in a new tab to complete login.
+            properties:
+                authorize_url:
+                    type: string
+            required:
+                - authorize_url
+            type: object
+        HfAuthLogoutResponse:
+            description: Result of the logout call (always logged_out = true).
+            properties:
+                logged_out:
+                    type: boolean
+            required:
+                - logged_out
+            type: object
+        HfAuthStatus:
+            description: Inline snapshot of the server's HuggingFace OAuth state.
+            properties:
+                eligible:
+                    description: True iff this deployment can surface interactive HF login.
+                    type: boolean
+                token_available:
+                    description: True iff a token (possibly expired but refreshable) is stored.
+                    type: boolean
+            required:
+                - token_available
+                - eligible
+            type: object
+        HfAuthTokenStatusResponse:
+            description: Whether the server holds an HF OAuth token + resolved username.
+            properties:
+                token_available:
+                    type: boolean
+                username:
+                    nullable: true
+                    type: string
+            required:
+                - token_available
+            type: object
         HistoryDetailEntry:
             description: History entry with full prompt data
             properties:
@@ -798,6 +926,41 @@ components:
                 - name
                 - folders
             type: object
+        ModelStatusEntry:
+            description: Everything the UI needs to render one row of the model.
+            properties:
+                file_size:
+                    description: Bytes, when known. Cached server-side per URL.
+                    format: int64
+                    nullable: true
+                    type: integer
+                is_hf_downloadable:
+                    description: |
+                        HuggingFace-only signal. True if the server can fetch this
+                        URL with its current auth state (public, or gated-with-access).
+                        False if gated and lacking access. Null for non-HF URLs and
+                        for HF URLs whose probe failed entirely.
+                    nullable: true
+                    type: boolean
+                progress:
+                    type: object
+                    allOf:
+                        - $ref: '#/components/schemas/DownloadProgress'
+                    description: Present when `state == downloading`.
+                    nullable: true
+                state:
+                    description: |
+                        `available` — file is on disk.
+                        `missing` — not on disk and no download in flight.
+                        `downloading` — server is currently fetching the file.
+                    enum:
+                        - available
+                        - missing
+                        - downloading
+                    type: string
+            required:
+                - state
+            type: object
         NodeInfo:
             description: Metadata describing a single ComfyUI node type and its inputs/outputs.
             properties:
@@ -2350,6 +2513,72 @@ paths:
             summary: Get tag histogram for filtered assets
             tags:
                 - file
+    /api/cancel-model-download-session:
+        post:
+            description: |
+                Cancels the download session for the given model_id. The worker
+                observes the cancellation between chunks, removes its partial `.tmp`
+                file, and exits without writing the destination path.
+            operationId: postCancelModelDownloadSession
+            requestBody:
+                content:
+                    application/json:
+                        schema:
+                            $ref: '#/components/schemas/CancelDownloadSessionRequest'
+                required: true
+            responses:
+                "200":
+                    content:
+                        application/json:
+                            schema:
+                                $ref: '#/components/schemas/CancelDownloadSessionResponse'
+                    description: Session cancelled.
+                "404":
+                    content:
+                        application/json:
+                            schema:
+                                $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse'
+                    description: No active download for that model_id.
+            summary: Cancel an in-flight server-side model download
+            tags:
+                - model
+    /api/download-models:
+        post:
+            description: |
+                Schedules downloads for every model_id in the request map. Returns
+                immediately after validation; progress is observed via
+                `/api/models-availability-status`. Fails atomically if any model
+                is already on disk, already downloading, gated, or has a URL that
+                is not on the server's allowlist (HuggingFace, Civitai, localhost).
+            operationId: postDownloadModels
+            requestBody:
+                content:
+                    application/json:
+                        schema:
+                            $ref: '#/components/schemas/DownloadModelsRequest'
+                required: true
+            responses:
+                "202":
+                    content:
+                        application/json:
+                            schema:
+                                $ref: '#/components/schemas/DownloadModelsResponse'
+                    description: Downloads accepted and scheduled.
+                "400":
+                    content:
+                        application/json:
+                            schema:
+                                $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse'
+                    description: One of the requested models is invalid, gated, or has a non-allowed URL.
+                "409":
+                    content:
+                        application/json:
+                            schema:
+                                $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse'
+                    description: One of the requested models is already on disk or downloading.
+            summary: Start a server-side download of one or more models
+            tags:
+                - model
     /api/embeddings:
         get:
             description: Returns the list of text-encoder embeddings available on disk.
@@ -2655,6 +2884,74 @@ paths:
             summary: Get a specific subgraph blueprint
             tags:
                 - workflow
+    /api/hf-auth-login-start:
+        post:
+            description: |
+                Spawns a short-lived loopback callback server (port 41954) and
+                returns the URL the frontend should open in a new tab. After the
+                user grants consent, HF redirects back to the callback URL with
+                an authorization code; the server exchanges that for a token and
+                persists it. Subsequent `/api/hf-auth-token-status` calls will
+                return `token_available: true`. Rejected with 403 if the
+                deployment is not eligible (not loopback or in --multi-user mode);
+                409 if another login attempt is already in progress.
+            operationId: postHfAuthLoginStart
+            responses:
+                "200":
+                    content:
+                        application/json:
+                            schema:
+                                $ref: '#/components/schemas/HfAuthLoginStartResponse'
+                    description: Login flow started; `authorize_url` is ready.
+                "403":
+                    content:
+                        application/json:
+                            schema:
+                                $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse'
+                    description: Deployment is not eligible for interactive HF login.
+                "409":
+                    content:
+                        application/json:
+                            schema:
+                                $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse'
+                    description: Another login attempt is already in progress.
+            summary: Begin a HuggingFace OAuth login flow
+            tags:
+                - model
+    /api/hf-auth-logout:
+        post:
+            description: Clears the in-memory cache and removes the on-disk token file.
+            operationId: postHfAuthLogout
+            responses:
+                "200":
+                    content:
+                        application/json:
+                            schema:
+                                $ref: '#/components/schemas/HfAuthLogoutResponse'
+                    description: Logged out (idempotent — succeeds even if no token was held).
+            summary: Drop the stored HuggingFace OAuth token
+            tags:
+                - model
+    /api/hf-auth-token-status:
+        get:
+            description: |
+                Returns `token_available: true` when the server has a token
+                in memory (or on disk) for HuggingFace, irrespective of whether
+                the access_token is currently fresh — an expired one with a
+                refresh_token still counts as "logged in" because we'll refresh
+                transparently on next use. If a username is resolvable via
+                `HfApi.whoami` we return that too, for the settings UI.
+            operationId: getHfAuthTokenStatus
+            responses:
+                "200":
+                    content:
+                        application/json:
+                            schema:
+                                $ref: '#/components/schemas/HfAuthTokenStatusResponse'
+                    description: Token status.
+            summary: Whether the server holds a usable HuggingFace OAuth token
+            tags:
+                - model
     /api/history:
         post:
             deprecated: true
@@ -3157,6 +3454,48 @@ paths:
             summary: Cancel multiple jobs
             tags:
                 - workflow
+    /api/models-availability-status:
+        post:
+            description: |
+                Given a map of `{model_id: url}` (model_id is
+                `<directory>/<filename>`), returns per-id state plus the
+                metadata the UI needs to render the row:
+
+                  - `state` — one of `available` / `missing` / `downloading`
+                  - `progress` — embedded when `state == downloading`
+                  - `file_size` — bytes (when known)
+                  - `is_hf_downloadable` — for HF URLs only: true if the
+                    server can currently fetch the file with its stored auth
+                    state, false if gated and lacking access, null otherwise
+
+                Designed for 1 Hz polling. `file_size` and the intrinsic
+                "is this model gated" check are cached server-side per URL;
+                `is_hf_downloadable` is recomputed per call so license
+                acceptance and login/logout transitions show up within one
+                poll interval without any client-side cache plumbing.
+            operationId: postModelsAvailabilityStatus
+            requestBody:
+                content:
+                    application/json:
+                        schema:
+                            $ref: '#/components/schemas/AvailabilityStatusRequest'
+                required: true
+            responses:
+                "200":
+                    content:
+                        application/json:
+                            schema:
+                                $ref: '#/components/schemas/AvailabilityStatusResponse'
+                    description: Per-model status and metadata.
+                "400":
+                    content:
+                        application/json:
+                            schema:
+                                $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse'
+                    description: Malformed request body.
+            summary: Unified per-model status + metadata for the polling UI
+            tags:
+                - model
     /api/node_replacements:
         get:
             description: |
@@ -5103,3 +5442,5 @@ tags:
       name: queue
     - description: Job lifecycle queries
       name: job
+    - description: Server-side model availability and downloads
+      name: model

requirements.txt

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ numpy>=1.25.0
 einops
 transformers>=4.50.3
 tokenizers>=0.13.3
+huggingface_hub
 sentencepiece
 safetensors>=0.4.2
 aiohttp>=3.11.8

server.py

@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ from app.assets.seeder import asset_seeder
 from app.assets.api.routes import register_assets_routes
 from app.assets.services.ingest import register_file_in_place
 from app.assets.services.asset_management import resolve_hash_to_path
+from app.model_downloader.api.routes import register_routes as register_model_downloader_routes
 
 from app.user_manager import UserManager
 from app.model_manager import ModelFileManager
@@ -257,6 +258,7 @@ class PromptServer():
         else:
             register_assets_routes(self.app)
             asset_seeder.disable()
+        register_model_downloader_routes(self.app)
         routes = web.RouteTableDef()
         self.routes = routes
         self.last_node_id = None

tests-unit/app_test/hf_auth_test.py

@@ -0,0 +1,708 @@
+"""Unit tests for the HuggingFace auth subsystem.
+
+Covers:
+  - token store: save/load roundtrip, chmod 0600, atomic write, delete
+  - eligibility under various CLI-arg combinations
+  - URL parsing (huggingface.co host detection + repo_id extraction)
+  - HF-aware gated_detection.probe_url (mocked auth_check)
+  - HF auth routes (token status, login start with eligibility gate, logout)
+  - PKCE primitives + authorize URL shape
+
+The OAuth callback server itself isn't exercised end-to-end here — that
+requires a real HF server. We test the components (state checking,
+URL building, code-exchange request shape) instead.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import stat
+from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+from aiohttp import web
+
+from app.model_downloader.api.routes import register_routes
+from app.model_downloader.hf_auth import oauth
+from app.model_downloader.hf_auth.auth_store import HF_AUTH_STORE, HfAuthStore
+from app.model_downloader.hf_auth.token_store import (
+    EXPIRY_BUFFER_SECS,
+    Token,
+    delete_token,
+    load_token,
+    save_token,
+)
+from app.model_downloader.hf_url import is_hf_url, repo_id_from_url
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Fixtures
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def patched_user_dir(tmp_path):
+    """Redirect ``folder_paths.get_user_directory`` so the token file
+    lands in an isolated tmp_path instead of the real user dir."""
+    user_dir = tmp_path / "user"
+    user_dir.mkdir()
+    with patch("folder_paths.get_user_directory", return_value=str(user_dir)):
+        yield user_dir
+
+
+def _token_file_path(user_dir) -> str:
+    return os.path.join(user_dir, "__hf_auth", "hf_auth_token.json")
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def fresh_auth_store():
+    """Wipe singleton state between tests: auth + probe caches."""
+    from app.model_downloader import gated_detection
+
+    HF_AUTH_STORE._token = None
+    HF_AUTH_STORE._loaded_from_disk = False
+    gated_detection.clear_caches_for_tests()
+    yield HF_AUTH_STORE
+    HF_AUTH_STORE._token = None
+    HF_AUTH_STORE._loaded_from_disk = False
+    gated_detection.clear_caches_for_tests()
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def app(patched_user_dir, fresh_auth_store):
+    app = web.Application()
+    register_routes(app)
+    return app
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# URL parsing
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+def test_is_hf_url_recognises_huggingface_co():
+    assert is_hf_url("https://huggingface.co/x/y/resolve/main/z.safetensors")
+    assert is_hf_url("https://huggingface.co/abc")
+    assert not is_hf_url("https://hf-mirror.com/x/y/resolve/main/z.safetensors")
+    assert not is_hf_url("https://civitai.com/x.safetensors")
+
+
+def test_repo_id_from_url_extracts_org_and_repo():
+    url = "https://huggingface.co/Lightricks/LTX-2.3-22b-IC-LoRA-HDR/resolve/main/x.safetensors"
+    assert repo_id_from_url(url) == "Lightricks/LTX-2.3-22b-IC-LoRA-HDR"
+
+
+def test_repo_id_from_url_handles_nested_path():
+    url = "https://huggingface.co/Comfy-Org/ltx-2.3/resolve/main/split_files/loras/x.safetensors"
+    assert repo_id_from_url(url) == "Comfy-Org/ltx-2.3"
+
+
+def test_repo_id_from_url_returns_none_for_non_hf():
+    assert repo_id_from_url("https://civitai.com/x.safetensors") is None
+
+
+def test_repo_id_from_url_returns_none_for_non_resolve_paths():
+    assert repo_id_from_url("https://huggingface.co/org/repo/blob/main/x.safetensors") is None
+    assert repo_id_from_url("https://huggingface.co/org") is None
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Token store
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+def test_token_store_roundtrip(patched_user_dir):
+    tok = Token(
+        access_token="hf_abc",
+        refresh_token="rf_def",
+        expires_at=9999999999.0,
+        scope="openid profile",
+    )
+    save_token(tok)
+    loaded = load_token()
+    assert loaded == tok
+
+
+def test_token_store_writes_0600(patched_user_dir):
+    tok = Token(access_token="x", refresh_token=None, expires_at=0.0)
+    save_token(tok)
+    path = _token_file_path(patched_user_dir)
+    mode = stat.S_IMODE(os.stat(path).st_mode)
+    # On Windows we silently no-op chmod; allow either the intended
+    # mode or whatever umask the OS gave us.
+    if os.name == "posix":
+        assert mode == 0o600
+
+
+def test_token_store_delete_removes_file(patched_user_dir):
+    tok = Token(access_token="x", refresh_token=None, expires_at=0.0)
+    save_token(tok)
+    delete_token()
+    path = _token_file_path(patched_user_dir)
+    assert not os.path.exists(path)
+    # Idempotent: second delete is fine.
+    delete_token()
+
+
+def test_token_store_load_returns_none_for_missing_file(patched_user_dir):
+    assert load_token() is None
+
+
+def test_token_store_load_returns_none_for_corrupt_file(patched_user_dir):
+    path = _token_file_path(patched_user_dir)
+    os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path), exist_ok=True)
+    with open(path, "w") as f:
+        f.write("not json {")
+    assert load_token() is None
+
+
+def test_token_is_valid_uses_buffer(patched_user_dir):
+    import time
+
+    fresh = Token(access_token="x", refresh_token=None, expires_at=time.time() + 3600)
+    nearly_expired = Token(
+        access_token="x",
+        refresh_token=None,
+        expires_at=time.time() + EXPIRY_BUFFER_SECS - 1,
+    )
+    assert fresh.is_valid()
+    assert not nearly_expired.is_valid()
+
+
+def test_token_is_valid_rejects_empty_access_token():
+    import time
+
+    tok = Token(access_token="", refresh_token=None, expires_at=time.time() + 3600)
+    assert not tok.is_valid()
+
+
+def test_token_is_valid_rejects_at_exact_buffer_boundary():
+    import time
+
+    tok = Token(
+        access_token="x",
+        refresh_token=None,
+        expires_at=time.time() + EXPIRY_BUFFER_SECS,
+    )
+    assert not tok.is_valid()
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Auth store
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+def test_auth_store_loads_lazily(patched_user_dir):
+    tok = Token(access_token="x", refresh_token=None, expires_at=9999999999.0)
+    save_token(tok)
+    store = HfAuthStore()
+    assert store.has_token()
+    assert store.get_token_sync() == tok
+
+
+def test_auth_store_set_persists(patched_user_dir):
+    store = HfAuthStore()
+    tok = Token(access_token="x", refresh_token=None, expires_at=9999999999.0)
+    store.set_token(tok)
+    # Token is on disk now — a fresh store sees it.
+    assert HfAuthStore().get_token_sync() == tok
+
+
+def test_auth_store_clear_removes_in_memory_and_on_disk(patched_user_dir):
+    store = HfAuthStore()
+    tok = Token(access_token="x", refresh_token=None, expires_at=9999999999.0)
+    store.set_token(tok)
+    store.clear()
+    assert not store.has_token()
+    assert HfAuthStore().get_token_sync() is None
+
+
+def test_auth_store_has_token_true_when_expired_but_refreshable(patched_user_dir):
+    import time
+
+    store = HfAuthStore()
+    expired = Token(
+        access_token="old",
+        refresh_token="rf",
+        expires_at=time.time() - 100,
+    )
+    store.set_token(expired)
+    assert store.has_token()
+    assert not expired.is_valid()
+
+
+def test_auth_store_get_token_sync_returns_expired_without_refresh(patched_user_dir):
+    import time
+
+    store = HfAuthStore()
+    expired = Token(
+        access_token="old",
+        refresh_token=None,
+        expires_at=time.time() - 100,
+    )
+    store.set_token(expired)
+    assert store.get_token_sync() == expired
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_auth_store_get_valid_returns_none_when_expired_without_refresh(
+    patched_user_dir,
+):
+    import time
+
+    store = HfAuthStore()
+    expired = Token(
+        access_token="old",
+        refresh_token=None,
+        expires_at=time.time() - 100,
+    )
+    store.set_token(expired)
+    with patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.hf_auth.oauth.refresh_access_token",
+        new=AsyncMock(),
+    ) as refresh_mock:
+        result = await store.get_valid_token()
+    assert result is None
+    refresh_mock.assert_not_called()
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_auth_store_get_valid_returns_fresh_token(patched_user_dir):
+    store = HfAuthStore()
+    import time
+
+    tok = Token(access_token="x", refresh_token=None, expires_at=time.time() + 3600)
+    store.set_token(tok)
+    fetched = await store.get_valid_token()
+    assert fetched == tok
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_auth_store_get_valid_refresh_on_expired(patched_user_dir):
+    store = HfAuthStore()
+    import time
+
+    expired = Token(
+        access_token="old",
+        refresh_token="rf",
+        expires_at=time.time() - 100,
+    )
+    store.set_token(expired)
+    refreshed = Token(
+        access_token="new",
+        refresh_token="rf",
+        expires_at=time.time() + 3600,
+    )
+    with patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.hf_auth.oauth.refresh_access_token",
+        new=AsyncMock(return_value=refreshed),
+    ):
+        result = await store.get_valid_token()
+    assert result == refreshed
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_auth_store_get_valid_token_does_not_resurrect_after_logout(
+    patched_user_dir,
+):
+    """A logout landing *during* an in-flight refresh must not be undone by
+    the refresh writing the token back (the resurrection race)."""
+    store = HfAuthStore()
+    import time
+
+    expired = Token(
+        access_token="old", refresh_token="rf", expires_at=time.time() - 100
+    )
+    store.set_token(expired)
+    refreshed = Token(
+        access_token="new", refresh_token="rf", expires_at=time.time() + 3600
+    )
+
+    async def fake_refresh(_refresh_token):
+        # Simulate the user clicking "Log out" while the refresh is in flight.
+        store.clear()
+        return refreshed
+
+    with patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.hf_auth.oauth.refresh_access_token",
+        new=fake_refresh,
+    ):
+        result = await store.get_valid_token()
+
+    # The refresh result is discarded — logout wins, in memory and on disk.
+    assert result is None
+    assert not store.has_token()
+    assert load_token() is None
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_auth_store_get_valid_returns_none_on_refresh_failure(patched_user_dir):
+    store = HfAuthStore()
+    import time
+
+    expired = Token(
+        access_token="old",
+        refresh_token="rf",
+        expires_at=time.time() - 100,
+    )
+    store.set_token(expired)
+    with patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.hf_auth.oauth.refresh_access_token",
+        new=AsyncMock(side_effect=RuntimeError("HF down")),
+    ):
+        result = await store.get_valid_token()
+    assert result is None
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Eligibility
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "listen,multi_user,expected",
+    [
+        ("127.0.0.1", False, True),
+        ("127.0.0.1", True, False),    # multi-user disables it
+        ("0.0.0.0", False, False),     # bind-all is not loopback
+        ("0.0.0.0", True, False),
+        ("192.168.1.5", False, False), # LAN address
+        ("::1", False, True),          # IPv6 loopback
+    ],
+)
+def test_eligibility(listen, multi_user, expected, monkeypatch):
+    from app.model_downloader.hf_auth import eligibility
+    from comfy.cli_args import args
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(args, "listen", listen)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(args, "multi_user", multi_user)
+    assert eligibility.is_hf_auth_eligible() is expected
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# gated_detection HF probe
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_probe_url_hf_public(fresh_auth_store):
+    """auth_check succeeds with no token → is_hf_downloadable = True."""
+    from app.model_downloader.gated_detection import probe_url
+
+    url = "https://huggingface.co/public/repo/resolve/main/x.safetensors"
+    with patch("app.model_downloader.gated_detection._auth_check_sync"), patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.gated_detection._probe_size_once",
+        new=AsyncMock(return_value=1024),
+    ):
+        result = await probe_url(url)
+    assert result.is_hf_downloadable is True
+    assert result.file_size == 1024
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_probe_url_hf_gated_no_access(fresh_auth_store):
+    """auth_check raises GatedRepoError → is_hf_downloadable = False."""
+    from huggingface_hub.errors import GatedRepoError
+
+    from app.model_downloader.gated_detection import probe_url
+
+    url = "https://huggingface.co/gated/repo/resolve/main/x.safetensors"
+    fake_response = MagicMock(status_code=403)
+    with patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.gated_detection._auth_check_sync",
+        side_effect=GatedRepoError("gated", response=fake_response),
+    ), patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.gated_detection._probe_size_once",
+        new=AsyncMock(return_value=None),
+    ):
+        result = await probe_url(url)
+    assert result.is_hf_downloadable is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_probe_url_non_hf_skips_auth_check():
+    """Non-HF URLs never call auth_check; is_hf_downloadable stays None."""
+    from app.model_downloader.gated_detection import probe_url
+
+    url = "https://civitai.com/api/download/models/1.safetensors"
+    with patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.gated_detection._auth_check_sync",
+    ) as mocked, patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.gated_detection._probe_size_once",
+        new=AsyncMock(return_value=2048),
+    ):
+        result = await probe_url(url)
+    assert result.is_hf_downloadable is None
+    assert result.file_size == 2048
+    mocked.assert_not_called()
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_is_gated_cached_across_calls(fresh_auth_store):
+    """Intrinsic ``is_gated`` should be determined exactly once per URL.
+
+    Subsequent ``probe_url`` calls for the same URL must not re-issue
+    the null-token auth_check — that's the whole point of the cache."""
+    from app.model_downloader.gated_detection import probe_url
+
+    url = "https://huggingface.co/public/repo/resolve/main/x.safetensors"
+    with patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.gated_detection._auth_check_sync"
+    ) as mocked, patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.gated_detection._probe_size_once",
+        new=AsyncMock(return_value=1024),
+    ):
+        await probe_url(url)
+        await probe_url(url)
+        await probe_url(url)
+    # Three probe_url calls × public-only-needs-1-auth_check = 1 call total.
+    assert mocked.call_count == 1
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_file_size_cached_across_calls(fresh_auth_store):
+    """Once a successful HEAD lands, subsequent calls don't re-HEAD."""
+    from app.model_downloader.gated_detection import probe_url
+
+    url = "https://huggingface.co/public/repo/resolve/main/x.safetensors"
+    with patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.gated_detection._auth_check_sync"
+    ), patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.gated_detection._probe_size_once",
+        new=AsyncMock(return_value=2048),
+    ) as size_probe:
+        r1 = await probe_url(url)
+        r2 = await probe_url(url)
+    assert r1.file_size == 2048
+    assert r2.file_size == 2048
+    assert size_probe.call_count == 1
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_file_size_not_probed_for_gated_no_access(fresh_auth_store):
+    """When ``is_hf_downloadable`` is False we must NOT HEAD the URL —
+    otherwise a 401-due-to-gating would land as a cached ``None`` that
+    survives a later successful login."""
+    from app.model_downloader.gated_detection import probe_url
+    from huggingface_hub.errors import GatedRepoError
+    from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+    url = "https://huggingface.co/gated/repo/resolve/main/x.safetensors"
+    fake_resp = MagicMock(status_code=403)
+    with patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.gated_detection._auth_check_sync",
+        side_effect=GatedRepoError("gated", response=fake_resp),
+    ), patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.gated_detection._probe_size_once",
+        new=AsyncMock(return_value=None),
+    ) as size_probe:
+        result = await probe_url(url)
+    assert result.is_hf_downloadable is False
+    assert result.file_size is None
+    assert size_probe.call_count == 0
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_probe_url_passes_token_when_available(fresh_auth_store, patched_user_dir):
+    """For a gated URL, auth_check runs twice: once with token=None to
+    determine the intrinsic ``is_gated`` flag (cached forever), and once
+    with the stored access_token to determine ``is_hf_downloadable`` for
+    the current user."""
+    from app.model_downloader import gated_detection
+    from app.model_downloader.gated_detection import probe_url
+    from huggingface_hub.errors import GatedRepoError
+    from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+    gated_detection.clear_caches_for_tests()
+    fresh_auth_store.set_token(Token(
+        access_token="hf_test_token",
+        refresh_token=None,
+        expires_at=9999999999.0,
+    ))
+    url = "https://huggingface.co/private/repo/resolve/main/x.safetensors"
+
+    fake_resp = MagicMock(status_code=403)
+
+    def fake_auth_check(repo_id, token):
+        # Null-token call → repo is gated. Subsequent call with the real
+        # token succeeds (user has access).
+        if token is None:
+            raise GatedRepoError("gated", response=fake_resp)
+
+    with patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.gated_detection._auth_check_sync",
+        side_effect=fake_auth_check,
+    ) as mocked, patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.gated_detection._probe_size_once",
+        new=AsyncMock(return_value=None),
+    ):
+        result = await probe_url(url)
+
+    # is_hf_downloadable should be True (token-authed call succeeded).
+    assert result.is_hf_downloadable is True
+    # Two calls: (repo_id, None) then (repo_id, <token>).
+    assert mocked.call_count == 2
+    assert mocked.call_args_list[0].args == ("private/repo", None)
+    assert mocked.call_args_list[1].args == ("private/repo", "hf_test_token")
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# OAuth primitives
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+def test_make_pkce_returns_distinct_high_entropy_values():
+    verifier1, challenge1, state1 = oauth._make_pkce()
+    verifier2, challenge2, state2 = oauth._make_pkce()
+    assert verifier1 != verifier2
+    assert challenge1 != challenge2
+    assert state1 != state2
+    # Verifier should be at least 43 chars per PKCE spec.
+    assert len(verifier1) >= 43
+
+
+def test_build_authorize_url_includes_pkce_and_state():
+    url = oauth._build_authorize_url("challenge123", "state456")
+    assert url.startswith(oauth.AUTHORIZE_URL)
+    assert "client_id=" + oauth.HF_CLIENT_ID in url
+    assert "code_challenge=challenge123" in url
+    assert "code_challenge_method=S256" in url
+    assert "state=state456" in url
+    assert "response_type=code" in url
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Routes
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_hf_auth_token_status_empty(aiohttp_client, app):
+    """No token set → token_available=false, username=null."""
+    client = await aiohttp_client(app)
+    resp = await client.get("/api/hf-auth-token-status")
+    assert resp.status == 200
+    data = await resp.json()
+    assert data == {"token_available": False, "username": None}
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_hf_auth_token_status_with_token(
+    aiohttp_client, app, fresh_auth_store, patched_user_dir
+):
+    """Token present, whoami works → username is returned."""
+    fresh_auth_store.set_token(Token(
+        access_token="x", refresh_token=None, expires_at=9999999999.0,
+    ))
+    with patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.api.routes._whoami_username",
+        return_value="alice",
+    ):
+        client = await aiohttp_client(app)
+        resp = await client.get("/api/hf-auth-token-status")
+    assert resp.status == 200
+    assert (await resp.json()) == {"token_available": True, "username": "alice"}
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_hf_auth_login_start_403_when_ineligible(aiohttp_client, app, monkeypatch):
+    """Not loopback / multi-user → 403."""
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        "app.model_downloader.api.routes.is_hf_auth_eligible",
+        lambda: False,
+    )
+    client = await aiohttp_client(app)
+    resp = await client.post("/api/hf-auth-login-start")
+    assert resp.status == 403
+    assert (await resp.json())["error"]["code"] == "HF_AUTH_NOT_ELIGIBLE"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_hf_auth_login_start_returns_authorize_url(aiohttp_client, app, monkeypatch):
+    """Eligible + first attempt → 200 with authorize_url."""
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        "app.model_downloader.api.routes.is_hf_auth_eligible",
+        lambda: True,
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        "app.model_downloader.api.routes.start_login_flow",
+        AsyncMock(return_value="https://huggingface.co/oauth/authorize?fake=1"),
+    )
+    client = await aiohttp_client(app)
+    resp = await client.post("/api/hf-auth-login-start")
+    assert resp.status == 200
+    assert (await resp.json())["authorize_url"].startswith(
+        "https://huggingface.co/oauth/authorize"
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_hf_auth_login_start_409_when_in_progress(aiohttp_client, app, monkeypatch):
+    """Lock already held → 409."""
+    from app.model_downloader.hf_auth.oauth import OAuthInProgressError
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        "app.model_downloader.api.routes.is_hf_auth_eligible",
+        lambda: True,
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        "app.model_downloader.api.routes.start_login_flow",
+        AsyncMock(side_effect=OAuthInProgressError()),
+    )
+    client = await aiohttp_client(app)
+    resp = await client.post("/api/hf-auth-login-start")
+    assert resp.status == 409
+    assert (await resp.json())["error"]["code"] == "HF_AUTH_IN_PROGRESS"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_hf_auth_login_start_503_when_callback_bind_fails(
+    aiohttp_client, app, monkeypatch
+):
+    """Callback server failed to bind (e.g. port busy) → 503, not a dead URL."""
+    from app.model_downloader.hf_auth.oauth import OAuthCallbackError
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        "app.model_downloader.api.routes.is_hf_auth_eligible",
+        lambda: True,
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        "app.model_downloader.api.routes.start_login_flow",
+        AsyncMock(side_effect=OAuthCallbackError("could not bind callback port")),
+    )
+    client = await aiohttp_client(app)
+    resp = await client.post("/api/hf-auth-login-start")
+    assert resp.status == 503
+    assert (await resp.json())["error"]["code"] == "HF_AUTH_START_FAILED"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_hf_auth_logout_clears_store(
+    aiohttp_client, app, fresh_auth_store, patched_user_dir
+):
+    fresh_auth_store.set_token(Token(
+        access_token="x", refresh_token=None, expires_at=9999999999.0,
+    ))
+    client = await aiohttp_client(app)
+    resp = await client.post("/api/hf-auth-logout")
+    assert resp.status == 200
+    assert (await resp.json()) == {"logged_out": True}
+    assert not fresh_auth_store.has_token()
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_availability_includes_hf_auth_snapshot(aiohttp_client, app, monkeypatch):
+    """The availability response embeds {token_available, eligible}."""
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        "app.model_downloader.api.routes.is_hf_auth_eligible",
+        lambda: True,
+    )
+    client = await aiohttp_client(app)
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/models-availability-status",
+        json={"models": {}},
+    )
+    assert resp.status == 200
+    data = await resp.json()
+    assert "hf_auth" in data
+    assert data["hf_auth"] == {"token_available": False, "eligible": True}

tests-unit/app_test/model_downloader_test.py

@@ -0,0 +1,514 @@
+"""Unit tests for the server-side model download subsystem.
+
+Covers the pieces that don't require talking to a real network:
+
+  - path parsing & allowlist (pure functions)
+  - DownloadServer registry lifecycle (in-memory state)
+  - API routes via aiohttp_client + folder_paths/probe_url patches
+
+Streaming downloads themselves are exercised indirectly — the route-level
+tests stub out the network probe so we can verify the gating logic in
+``download_models`` without making real HTTP calls.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+from unittest.mock import patch, AsyncMock
+
+import pytest
+from aiohttp import web
+
+from app.model_downloader.allowlist import is_url_allowed
+from app.model_downloader.api.routes import register_routes
+from app.model_downloader.download_server import DownloadServer
+from app.model_downloader.gated_detection import MetadataProbeResult
+from app.model_downloader.paths import (
+    InvalidModelId,
+    parse_model_id,
+    resolve_destination,
+    resolve_existing,
+)
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Fixtures
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def model_root(tmp_path):
+    """A fake ``models/`` root with two registered folder types."""
+    loras_dir = tmp_path / "loras"
+    checkpoints_dir = tmp_path / "checkpoints"
+    loras_dir.mkdir()
+    checkpoints_dir.mkdir()
+    return tmp_path, loras_dir, checkpoints_dir
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def patched_folder_paths(model_root):
+    """Point folder_paths at our fake roots for the duration of one test."""
+    _root, loras_dir, checkpoints_dir = model_root
+    mapping = {
+        "loras": ([str(loras_dir)], {".safetensors"}),
+        "checkpoints": ([str(checkpoints_dir)], {".safetensors"}),
+    }
+    with patch(
+        "folder_paths.folder_names_and_paths", mapping
+    ), patch(
+        "folder_paths.get_folder_paths",
+        side_effect=lambda name: mapping.get(name, ([], set()))[0],
+    ):
+        yield mapping
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def fresh_download_server():
+    """Reset the module-level singleton between tests so registry state
+    doesn't leak across tests sharing the singleton."""
+    from app.model_downloader.download_server import DOWNLOAD_SERVER
+
+    DOWNLOAD_SERVER.reset_for_tests()
+    yield DOWNLOAD_SERVER
+    DOWNLOAD_SERVER.reset_for_tests()
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def app(patched_folder_paths, fresh_download_server):
+    app = web.Application()
+    register_routes(app)
+    return app
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Pure helpers: allowlist + path parsing
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+def test_allowlist_accepts_hf_safetensors():
+    assert is_url_allowed("https://huggingface.co/x/y/resolve/main/z.safetensors")
+
+
+def test_allowlist_accepts_civitai_pth():
+    assert is_url_allowed("https://civitai.com/api/download/models/123.pth")
+
+
+def test_allowlist_rejects_unknown_host():
+    assert not is_url_allowed("https://example.com/x.safetensors")
+
+
+def test_allowlist_rejects_api_path_on_hf():
+    # On an allowlisted host but not pointing at a model file.
+    assert not is_url_allowed("https://huggingface.co/api/models")
+
+
+def test_allowlist_rejects_non_https_except_localhost():
+    assert not is_url_allowed("http://huggingface.co/x/y.safetensors")
+    assert is_url_allowed("http://localhost:8000/x.safetensors")
+
+
+def test_parse_model_id_valid(patched_folder_paths):
+    assert parse_model_id("loras/foo.safetensors") == ("loras", "foo.safetensors")
+
+
+def test_parse_model_id_rejects_traversal(patched_folder_paths):
+    with pytest.raises(InvalidModelId):
+        parse_model_id("../etc/passwd")
+
+
+def test_parse_model_id_rejects_unknown_folder(patched_folder_paths):
+    with pytest.raises(InvalidModelId):
+        parse_model_id("nope/x.safetensors")
+
+
+def test_parse_model_id_rejects_double_slash(patched_folder_paths):
+    with pytest.raises(InvalidModelId):
+        parse_model_id("loras/sub/x.safetensors")
+
+
+def test_resolve_existing_returns_path_when_present(model_root, patched_folder_paths):
+    _root, loras_dir, _ = model_root
+    target = loras_dir / "foo.safetensors"
+    target.write_bytes(b"x")
+    assert resolve_existing("loras/foo.safetensors") == str(target)
+
+
+def test_resolve_existing_returns_none_when_absent(patched_folder_paths):
+    assert resolve_existing("loras/missing.safetensors") is None
+
+
+def test_resolve_destination_returns_tmp_pair(model_root, patched_folder_paths):
+    _root, loras_dir, _ = model_root
+    final, tmp = resolve_destination("loras/foo.safetensors", epoch=7)
+    assert final == str(loras_dir / "foo.safetensors")
+    # Temp path embeds the session epoch (so cancel+retry can't collide on it)
+    # and uses the subsystem-specific suffix the startup sweep matches.
+    assert tmp == f"{final}.7.comfy-download.tmp"
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# DownloadServer registry: lifecycle, races, cancellation epoch semantics
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+def test_register_is_exclusive():
+    server = DownloadServer()
+    s1 = server.try_register("loras/x.safetensors", "https://huggingface.co/a")
+    s2 = server.try_register("loras/x.safetensors", "https://huggingface.co/b")
+    assert s1 is not None
+    assert s2 is None
+    assert server.is_downloading("loras/x.safetensors")
+
+
+def test_cancel_removes_session():
+    server = DownloadServer()
+    server.try_register("loras/x.safetensors", "https://huggingface.co/a")
+    assert server.cancel("loras/x.safetensors") is True
+    assert not server.is_downloading("loras/x.safetensors")
+
+
+def test_cancel_returns_false_when_absent():
+    server = DownloadServer()
+    assert server.cancel("loras/never.safetensors") is False
+
+
+def test_finish_only_clears_matching_epoch():
+    """If a session is cancelled and a new one for the same id is
+    registered, ``finish`` from the original worker must not evict the
+    newer session."""
+    server = DownloadServer()
+    s_old = server.try_register("loras/x.safetensors", "u1")
+    server.cancel("loras/x.safetensors")
+    s_new = server.try_register("loras/x.safetensors", "u2")
+    assert s_new is not None and s_new.epoch != s_old.epoch
+    # Old worker's late finish() is a no-op:
+    server.finish(s_old)
+    assert server.is_downloading("loras/x.safetensors")
+    server.finish(s_new)
+    assert not server.is_downloading("loras/x.safetensors")
+
+
+def test_is_active_follows_cancellation():
+    server = DownloadServer()
+    s = server.try_register("loras/x.safetensors", "u")
+    assert server.is_active(s)
+    server.cancel("loras/x.safetensors")
+    assert not server.is_active(s)
+
+
+def test_update_progress_tracks_fraction():
+    server = DownloadServer()
+    s = server.try_register("loras/x.safetensors", "u")
+    server.update_progress(s, 50, 100)
+    snap = server.snapshot()["loras/x.safetensors"]
+    assert snap.bytes_downloaded == 50
+    assert snap.total_bytes == 100
+    assert snap.progress == 0.5
+
+
+def test_update_progress_with_unknown_total_keeps_progress_none():
+    server = DownloadServer()
+    s = server.try_register("loras/x.safetensors", "u")
+    server.update_progress(s, 50, None)
+    assert server.snapshot()["loras/x.safetensors"].progress is None
+
+
+def test_cleanup_orphan_tmp_files(model_root):
+    """Orphan temp left by a crashed download must be swept on first use,
+    while unrelated *.tmp files in the model dir are left untouched."""
+    _root, loras_dir, _ = model_root
+    orphan = loras_dir / "stale.safetensors.3.comfy-download.tmp"
+    orphan.write_bytes(b"partial")
+    unrelated = loras_dir / "someothertool.tmp"
+    unrelated.write_bytes(b"not ours")
+    mapping = {"loras": ([str(loras_dir)], {".safetensors"})}
+    with patch("folder_paths.folder_names_and_paths", mapping), patch(
+        "folder_paths.get_folder_paths",
+        side_effect=lambda name: mapping.get(name, ([], set()))[0],
+    ):
+        server = DownloadServer()
+        assert orphan.exists(), "sweep must not run at construction time"
+        server.sweep_orphan_tmp_files()
+        assert not orphan.exists()
+        assert unrelated.exists(), "unrelated .tmp must not be swept"
+        # Idempotent — a second call is a cheap no-op.
+        server.sweep_orphan_tmp_files()
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Route: POST /api/models-availability-status
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_availability_partitions_correctly(
+    aiohttp_client, app, model_root, fresh_download_server
+):
+    _root, loras_dir, _ = model_root
+    (loras_dir / "present.safetensors").write_bytes(b"x")
+    fresh_download_server.try_register(
+        "loras/inflight.safetensors", "http://localhost:8000/x.safetensors"
+    )
+    client = await aiohttp_client(app)
+
+    # Stub probes — we're testing state assignment, not network calls.
+    with patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.api.routes.probe_url",
+        new=AsyncMock(return_value=MetadataProbeResult(
+            file_size=None, is_hf_downloadable=None,
+        )),
+    ):
+        body = {
+            "models": {
+                "loras/present.safetensors": "http://localhost:8000/p.safetensors",
+                "loras/missing.safetensors": "http://localhost:8000/m.safetensors",
+                "loras/inflight.safetensors": "http://localhost:8000/x.safetensors",
+            }
+        }
+        resp = await client.post("/api/models-availability-status", json=body)
+    assert resp.status == 200
+    data = await resp.json()
+    models = data["models"]
+    assert models["loras/present.safetensors"]["state"] == "available"
+    assert models["loras/missing.safetensors"]["state"] == "missing"
+    assert models["loras/inflight.safetensors"]["state"] == "downloading"
+    assert "hf_auth" in data
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_availability_invalid_id_classified_as_missing(aiohttp_client, app):
+    client = await aiohttp_client(app)
+    with patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.api.routes.probe_url",
+        new=AsyncMock(return_value=MetadataProbeResult(
+            file_size=None, is_hf_downloadable=None,
+        )),
+    ):
+        resp = await client.post(
+            "/api/models-availability-status",
+            json={"models": {"../etc/passwd": "http://localhost:8000/x.safetensors"}},
+        )
+    assert resp.status == 200
+    data = await resp.json()
+    assert data["models"]["../etc/passwd"]["state"] == "missing"
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Route: POST /api/download-models  — precondition gating
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_download_rejects_url_not_in_allowlist(aiohttp_client, app):
+    client = await aiohttp_client(app)
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/download-models",
+        json={"models": {"loras/x.safetensors": "https://evil.com/x.safetensors"}},
+    )
+    assert resp.status == 400
+    err = (await resp.json())["error"]
+    assert err["code"] == "URL_NOT_ALLOWED"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_download_rejects_already_available(
+    aiohttp_client, app, model_root
+):
+    _root, loras_dir, _ = model_root
+    (loras_dir / "x.safetensors").write_bytes(b"x")
+    client = await aiohttp_client(app)
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/download-models",
+        json={"models": {
+            "loras/x.safetensors": "https://huggingface.co/a/b/resolve/main/x.safetensors"
+        }},
+    )
+    assert resp.status == 409
+    assert (await resp.json())["error"]["code"] == "ALREADY_AVAILABLE"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_download_rejects_already_downloading(
+    aiohttp_client, app, fresh_download_server
+):
+    fresh_download_server.try_register(
+        "loras/x.safetensors", "https://huggingface.co/u.safetensors"
+    )
+    client = await aiohttp_client(app)
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/download-models",
+        json={"models": {
+            "loras/x.safetensors": "https://huggingface.co/a/b/resolve/main/x.safetensors"
+        }},
+    )
+    assert resp.status == 409
+    assert (await resp.json())["error"]["code"] == "ALREADY_DOWNLOADING"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_download_rejects_gated_model(aiohttp_client, app):
+    client = await aiohttp_client(app)
+    with patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.api.routes.probe_url",
+        new=AsyncMock(return_value=MetadataProbeResult(file_size=None, is_hf_downloadable=False)),
+    ):
+        resp = await client.post(
+            "/api/download-models",
+            json={"models": {
+                "loras/x.safetensors": "https://huggingface.co/g/r/resolve/main/x.safetensors"
+            }},
+        )
+    assert resp.status == 400
+    assert (await resp.json())["error"]["code"] == "MODEL_NOT_DOWNLOADABLE"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_download_rejects_invalid_model_id(aiohttp_client, app):
+    client = await aiohttp_client(app)
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/download-models",
+        json={"models": {"../etc/passwd": "https://huggingface.co/x.safetensors"}},
+    )
+    assert resp.status == 400
+    assert (await resp.json())["error"]["code"] == "INVALID_MODEL_ID"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_download_atomic_failure_does_not_register_partial(
+    aiohttp_client, app, model_root, fresh_download_server
+):
+    """If one model in a batch fails, none get registered."""
+    _root, loras_dir, _ = model_root
+    (loras_dir / "already.safetensors").write_bytes(b"x")
+    client = await aiohttp_client(app)
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/download-models",
+        json={
+            "models": {
+                "loras/already.safetensors":
+                    "https://huggingface.co/a/b/resolve/main/already.safetensors",
+                "loras/new.safetensors":
+                    "https://huggingface.co/a/b/resolve/main/new.safetensors",
+            }
+        },
+    )
+    assert resp.status == 409
+    # The "new" model should not have been registered as part of the
+    # failed batch.
+    assert not fresh_download_server.is_downloading("loras/new.safetensors")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_download_schedules_when_all_preconditions_pass(
+    aiohttp_client, app, fresh_download_server
+):
+    """Verify the precondition pass, registration pass, and async
+    scheduling all wire up correctly. We patch the streamer to avoid
+    real HTTP while still letting the route execute end-to-end."""
+    started = asyncio.Event()
+    finish_signal = asyncio.Event()
+
+    async def fake_stream(session):
+        started.set()
+        await finish_signal.wait()
+        from app.model_downloader.download_server import DOWNLOAD_SERVER
+        DOWNLOAD_SERVER.finish(session)
+        return "/dev/null"
+
+    with patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.api.routes.probe_url",
+        new=AsyncMock(return_value=MetadataProbeResult(file_size=42, is_hf_downloadable=True)),
+    ), patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.downloader.stream_to_disk", new=fake_stream
+    ):
+        client = await aiohttp_client(app)
+        resp = await client.post(
+            "/api/download-models",
+            json={"models": {
+                "loras/new.safetensors":
+                    "https://huggingface.co/a/b/resolve/main/new.safetensors"
+            }},
+        )
+        assert resp.status == 202
+        body = await resp.json()
+        assert body["accepted"] is True
+        assert body["scheduled"] == ["loras/new.safetensors"]
+        # Wait for the worker to actually start.
+        await asyncio.wait_for(started.wait(), timeout=2.0)
+        assert fresh_download_server.is_downloading("loras/new.safetensors")
+        finish_signal.set()
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Route: POST /api/cancel-model-download-session
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_cancel_removes_active_session(
+    aiohttp_client, app, fresh_download_server
+):
+    fresh_download_server.try_register(
+        "loras/x.safetensors", "https://huggingface.co/u.safetensors"
+    )
+    client = await aiohttp_client(app)
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/cancel-model-download-session",
+        json={"model_id": "loras/x.safetensors"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status == 200
+    assert (await resp.json())["cancelled"] is True
+    assert not fresh_download_server.is_downloading("loras/x.safetensors")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_cancel_returns_404_when_none(aiohttp_client, app):
+    client = await aiohttp_client(app)
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/cancel-model-download-session",
+        json={"model_id": "loras/nothing.safetensors"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status == 404
+    assert (await resp.json())["error"]["code"] == "NOT_DOWNLOADING"
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Unified availability response embeds metadata per id
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_availability_embeds_metadata(aiohttp_client, app):
+    """``file_size`` + ``is_hf_downloadable`` come back on the same
+    request as the state — no separate metadata endpoint."""
+    results = {
+        "https://huggingface.co/a/b/resolve/main/free.safetensors":
+            MetadataProbeResult(file_size=1024, is_hf_downloadable=True),
+        "https://huggingface.co/g/r/resolve/main/gated.safetensors":
+            MetadataProbeResult(file_size=None, is_hf_downloadable=False),
+    }
+
+    async def fake_probe(url):
+        return results[url]
+
+    with patch(
+        "app.model_downloader.api.routes.probe_url", new=fake_probe
+    ):
+        client = await aiohttp_client(app)
+        resp = await client.post(
+            "/api/models-availability-status",
+            json={
+                "models": {
+                    "loras/free.safetensors":
+                        "https://huggingface.co/a/b/resolve/main/free.safetensors",
+                    "loras/gated.safetensors":
+                        "https://huggingface.co/g/r/resolve/main/gated.safetensors",
+                }
+            },
+        )
+    assert resp.status == 200
+    models = (await resp.json())["models"]
+    assert models["loras/free.safetensors"]["file_size"] == 1024
+    assert models["loras/free.safetensors"]["is_hf_downloadable"] is True
+    assert models["loras/gated.safetensors"]["file_size"] is None
+    assert models["loras/gated.safetensors"]["is_hf_downloadable"] is False