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security: handle Windows backslash path traversal in filename validation

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Normalize backslashes to forward slashes before checking for path
traversal patterns, preventing attacks like `folder\..\secret` that
bypass forward-slash-only checks on Windows. Addresses review feedback
from light-and-ray on PR #12353.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Varun Chawla 2026-02-08 19:27:53 -08:00 committed by Test User
parent dd9f4d1a32
commit ae575a8670
No known key found for this signature in database
2 changed files with 33 additions and 6 deletions
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10
server.py
View File

@ -441,8 +441,9 @@ class PromptServer():
return web.Response(status=400) return web.Response(status=400)
# validation for security: prevent accessing arbitrary path # validation for security: prevent accessing arbitrary path
# Check for path traversal patterns (../ or /..) but allow consecutive dots in filename # Normalize backslashes to forward slashes to handle Windows-style path traversal (e.g., folder\..\secret)
if filename[0] == '/' or '/..' in filename or filename.startswith('..'): normalized = filename.replace('\\', '/')
if normalized[0] == '/' or '/..' in normalized or normalized.startswith('..'):
return web.Response(status=400) return web.Response(status=400)
if output_dir is None: if output_dir is None:
@ -486,8 +487,9 @@ class PromptServer():
return web.Response(status=400) return web.Response(status=400)
# validation for security: prevent accessing arbitrary path # validation for security: prevent accessing arbitrary path
# Check for path traversal patterns (../ or /..) but allow consecutive dots in filename # Normalize backslashes to forward slashes to handle Windows-style path traversal (e.g., folder\..\secret)
if filename[0] == '/' or '/..' in filename or filename.startswith('..'): normalized = filename.replace('\\', '/')
if normalized[0] == '/' or '/..' in normalized or normalized.startswith('..'):
return web.Response(status=400) return web.Response(status=400)
if output_dir is None: if output_dir is None:

29
tests-unit/server_test/test_view_endpoint.py
View File

@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ class TestViewEndpointSecurity(AioHTTPTestCase):
return web.Response(status=400) return web.Response(status=400)
# validation for security: prevent accessing arbitrary path # validation for security: prevent accessing arbitrary path
# Check for path traversal patterns (../ or /..) but allow consecutive dots in filename # Normalize backslashes to forward slashes to handle Windows-style path traversal
if filename[0] == '/' or '/..' in filename or filename.startswith('..'): normalized = filename.replace('\\', '/')
if normalized[0] == '/' or '/..' in normalized or normalized.startswith('..'):
return web.Response(status=400) return web.Response(status=400)
# For testing, just check if file exists in test directory # For testing, just check if file exists in test directory
@ -112,3 +113,27 @@ class TestViewEndpointSecurity(AioHTTPTestCase):
resp = await self.client.request("GET", "/view?filename=my..file..name.png") resp = await self.client.request("GET", "/view?filename=my..file..name.png")
assert resp.status == 200, "Should allow dots in middle of filename" assert resp.status == 200, "Should allow dots in middle of filename"
@unittest_run_loop
async def test_blocks_backslash_path_traversal(self):
"""Test that Windows-style backslash path traversal (\\..) is blocked"""
resp = await self.client.request("GET", "/view?filename=folder%5C..%5Csecret")
assert resp.status == 400, "Should block backslash path traversal"
@unittest_run_loop
async def test_blocks_backslash_dotdot_at_start(self):
"""Test that backslash path traversal starting with ..\\ is blocked"""
resp = await self.client.request("GET", "/view?filename=..%5Cetc%5Cpasswd")
assert resp.status == 400, "Should block ..\\ path traversal at start"
@unittest_run_loop
async def test_blocks_mixed_slash_backslash_traversal(self):
"""Test that mixed forward/backslash path traversal is blocked"""
resp = await self.client.request("GET", "/view?filename=folder/..%5Csecret")
assert resp.status == 400, "Should block mixed slash/backslash path traversal"
@unittest_run_loop
async def test_blocks_backslash_absolute_path(self):
"""Test that Windows absolute paths with backslash are blocked (e.g., C:\\)"""
resp = await self.client.request("GET", "/view?filename=%5Cetc%5Cpasswd")
assert resp.status == 400, "Should block backslash absolute paths"