security: address review feedback on GHSA-779p fixes

- Fix Windows CI failure in test_get_annotated_filepath: compare against
  os.path.abspath(...) to match the intentional abspath normalization added
  by the traversal hardening (abspath prepends the drive letter on Windows).
- origin_check: narrow the bare `except:` in is_loopback() to ValueError so
  genuine interrupts aren't swallowed (review nit).
- origin_check: guard .port access in is_cross_origin_forbidden() so a
  malformed/out-of-range port (e.g. Origin: http://127.0.0.1:99999) fails
  closed with a 403 instead of surfacing an uncaught 500 in the middleware.
- server /view: escape backslash/quote in the Content-Disposition filename
  (RFC 6266 quoted-string) so a filename containing a double quote can't
  malform the response header.

server.py

@@ -587,10 +587,15 @@ class PromptServer():
                         # bare filename= hint does not force a download per
                         # RFC 6266, so we only attach it on the dangerous branch
                         # to avoid breaking inline display of legitimate images.
-                        disposition = f"filename=\"{filename}\""
+                        # Escape backslash/quote per RFC 6266 quoted-string so a
+                        # filename containing a double quote (which passes the
+                        # ".."/leading-slash filter above) can't break out of the
+                        # header's quoted-string and malform the disposition.
+                        safe_filename = filename.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"')
+                        disposition = f"filename=\"{safe_filename}\""
                         if folder_paths.is_dangerous_content_type(content_type):
                             content_type = 'application/octet-stream'
-                            disposition = f"attachment; filename=\"{filename}\""
+                            disposition = f"attachment; filename=\"{safe_filename}\""
 
                         return web.FileResponse(
                             file,

tests-unit/comfy_test/folder_path_test.py

@@ -53,8 +53,11 @@ def test_annotated_filepath():
 
 def test_get_annotated_filepath():
     default_dir = "/default/dir"
-    assert folder_paths.get_annotated_filepath("test.txt", default_dir) == os.path.join(default_dir, "test.txt")
-    assert folder_paths.get_annotated_filepath("test.txt [output]") == os.path.join(folder_paths.get_output_directory(), "test.txt")
+    # get_annotated_filepath now normalizes with os.path.abspath (part of the
+    # GHSA-779p traversal hardening), so compare against the normalized form —
+    # on Windows abspath also prepends the current drive letter.
+    assert folder_paths.get_annotated_filepath("test.txt", default_dir) == os.path.abspath(os.path.join(default_dir, "test.txt"))
+    assert folder_paths.get_annotated_filepath("test.txt [output]") == os.path.abspath(os.path.join(folder_paths.get_output_directory(), "test.txt"))
 
 def test_add_model_folder_path_append(clear_folder_paths):
     folder_paths.add_model_folder_path("test_folder", "/default/path", is_default=True)

utils/origin_check.py

@@ -25,7 +25,10 @@ def is_loopback(host):
             return True
         else:
             return False
-    except:
+    except ValueError:
+        # Not an IP literal (ip_address raises ValueError); fall through to DNS
+        # resolution below. Narrowed from a bare except so genuine interrupts
+        # (KeyboardInterrupt/SystemExit) aren't swallowed.
         pass
 
     loopback = False
@@ -64,11 +67,21 @@ def is_cross_origin_forbidden(host, origin):
     origin_domain = parsed.netloc.lower()
     host_domain_parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit('//' + host_domain)
 
+    # A non-numeric or out-of-range port (e.g. Origin: http://127.0.0.1:99999)
+    # makes urllib raise ValueError on .port access. Treat a malformed port as a
+    # rejected request rather than letting it surface as an uncaught 500 in the
+    # middleware — it fails closed, consistent with the CSRF stance.
+    try:
+        origin_port = parsed.port
+        host_port = host_domain_parsed.port
+    except ValueError:
+        return True
+
     loopback = is_loopback(host_domain_parsed.hostname)
 
-    if parsed.port is None:  # if origin doesn't have a port strip it from the host to handle weird browsers, same for host
+    if origin_port is None:  # if origin doesn't have a port strip it from the host to handle weird browsers, same for host
         host_domain = host_domain_parsed.hostname
-    if host_domain_parsed.port is None:
+    if host_port is None:
         origin_domain = parsed.hostname
 
     if loopback and host_domain is not None and len(host_domain) > 0: