mirror of
https://github.com/Comfy-Org/ComfyUI-Manager.git
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01799f8cac
Lets clients detect CSRF-POST backend support via ComfyUI core's feature_flags instead of parsing version strings. Absence of the flag indicates a Manager version < 4.2.1 that is incompatible with POST-only state-mutation endpoints. Follow-up to #2818; no endpoint or security behavior change.
130 lines
6.9 KiB
Markdown
130 lines
6.9 KiB
Markdown
# Changelog
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All notable changes to **ComfyUI-Manager** are documented in this file.
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The format is based on [Keep a Changelog 1.1.0](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
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and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning 2.0.0](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
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## [4.2.1] - 2026-04-22
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Security-hardening release. Contains breaking-ish API changes for
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state-mutating endpoints. See **Migration notes** below before upgrading
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programmatic clients.
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### Security
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- **CSRF Content-Type gate**: 18 state-mutation POST handlers (9 in `glob`, 9 in
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`legacy`) now reject the three CORS "simple request" Content-Types
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(`application/x-www-form-urlencoded`, `multipart/form-data`, `text/plain`).
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This closes the residual `<form method="POST">` bypass route that remained
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after the GET→POST transition. Legitimate clients using `application/json`
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(or no body) are unaffected.
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- **`do_fix` security level raised from `high` to `high+`**: aligns the
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enforcement gate (`is_allowed_security_level`) with the log text emitted by
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`SECURITY_MESSAGE_HIGH_P`. Both `glob/manager_server.py` and
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`legacy/manager_server.py` updated in lockstep. Environments running at
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`security_level = high` can no longer fix a nodepack — use
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`security_level = normal` or lower.
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- **Config setters now gated at `middle` security level**:
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`POST /v2/manager/db_mode`, `POST /v2/manager/policy/update`, and
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`POST /v2/manager/channel_url_list` now check
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`is_allowed_security_level('middle')` before mutating configuration (both
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`glob` and `legacy`). Closes a pre-existing gap where the write path was
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reachable at any security level. Reads (`GET`) remain unrestricted.
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### Changed
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- **State-changing endpoints converted from `GET` to `POST`** (CSRF hardening):
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`/v2/manager/queue/{update_all, reset, start, update_comfyui}`,
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`/v2/snapshot/{remove, restore, save}`,
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`/v2/comfyui_manager/comfyui_switch_version`,
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`/v2/manager/reboot`.
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Query-string parameters are preserved where they existed; only the HTTP
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method changes.
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- **`POST /v2/comfyui_manager/comfyui_switch_version` parameters moved from
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query string to JSON body** (REST idiom + body-reading CSRF posture):
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The handler now consumes `application/json` with the body shape
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`{"ver": "...", "client_id": "...", "ui_id": "..."}` instead of reading
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`?ver=...&client_id=...&ui_id=...` from the URL. Because body-reading
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handlers are already covered by the CORS-preflight mechanism for
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cross-origin protection, the Content-Type rejection gate introduced for
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the other state-mutation endpoints is intentionally NOT applied here
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(see `comfyui_manager/common/manager_security.py` module docstring).
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The first-party JS client in `comfyui_manager/js/comfyui-manager.js`
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was updated in the same change; third-party callers must migrate.
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- **Config endpoints split into `GET` (read) + `POST` (write)**:
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`/v2/manager/{db_mode, policy/update, channel_url_list}`. `GET` returns the
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current value; `POST` accepts a JSON body `{"value": "..."}`. The prior
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single-method form that accepted a `?value=...` query parameter on either
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verb is retired.
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- **`openapi.yaml` fully resynchronized** with the server: HTTP methods, the
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dual-method splits above, request-body schemas for the new POST setters,
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and the `TaskHistoryItem.params` field now match `manager_server.py`.
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- **Legacy `restart(self)` → `restart(request)`**: parameter name corrected.
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No behavioral change.
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### Added
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- **Server-push feature flag `extension.manager.supports_csrf_post`** registered
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at startup, allowing ComfyUI-frontend (and other clients) to detect
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CSRF-POST backend support as a semantic capability contract, without
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relying on version string parsing. Manager versions prior to 4.2.1 do not
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set the flag — clients should treat its absence as 'incompatible with
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POST-only state-mutation endpoints'.
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- **E2E test harness variants** for security-level and legacy-mode scenarios:
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`tests/e2e/scripts/start_comfyui_legacy.sh`,
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`tests/e2e/scripts/start_comfyui_permissive.sh`,
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`tests/e2e/scripts/start_comfyui_strict.sh`. See
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`docs/guide/GUIDE_E2E_TEST.md` for usage.
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- **`COMFYUI_MANAGER_SKIP_MANAGER_REQUIREMENTS` environment variable**: when
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set, skips the `manager_requirements.txt` reinstall path. Intended for E2E
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environments where those dependencies are provisioned separately.
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- **`TaskHistoryItem.params` field** (Pydantic + `openapi.yaml`): mirrors
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`QueueTaskItem.params` so that task history retains the original request
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payload (nullable when unavailable).
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- **Automated endpoint coverage** — pytest E2E + Playwright specs covering all
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39 unique `(method, path)` endpoints across `glob` and `legacy`. Coverage is
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tracked in `reports/api-coverage-matrix.md` and
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`reports/e2e_test_coverage.md`.
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### Removed
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- **Legacy per-operation POST routes consolidated into `POST /v2/manager/queue/batch`**:
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`/v2/manager/queue/{install, uninstall, update, fix, disable, reinstall, abort_current}`.
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The first-party JS client already uses `queue/batch`; only third-party
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scripts that call the per-operation routes directly are affected.
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- **`GET /manager/notice`** (v1, pip-install redirect banner).
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`GET /v2/manager/notice` remains available.
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### Migration notes
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- Third-party clients calling `POST /v2/manager/queue/install` (and the other
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per-operation queue routes) must switch to
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`POST /v2/manager/queue/batch` with a body such as
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`{"install": [{id, ver, ...}], "batch_id": "..."}`. See
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`reports/endpoint_scenarios.md` for the full payload shape.
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- Programmatic clients that posted to the CSRF-hardened endpoints with
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`application/x-www-form-urlencoded`, `multipart/form-data`, or `text/plain`
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must switch to `application/json` (or omit the body entirely when the
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endpoint takes its parameters from the query string).
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- Clients that called any of the methods listed under **Changed → State-changing
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endpoints** with `GET` must switch to `POST`. Query parameters remain valid.
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- Clients that wrote configuration via
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`GET /v2/manager/{db_mode, policy/update, channel_url_list}?value=...`
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must switch to `POST` with JSON body `{"value": "..."}`.
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- Third-party scripts calling
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`POST /v2/comfyui_manager/comfyui_switch_version?ver=...&client_id=...&ui_id=...`
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must switch to `POST` with `Content-Type: application/json` and body
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`{"ver": "...", "client_id": "...", "ui_id": "..."}`. The query-string
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form no longer works.
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- Environments running at `security_level = high` can no longer run
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`do_fix`. Either lower the security level (`normal`, `normal-`, or `weak`
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as appropriate) or skip the fix operation.
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- Environments running at `security_level = high` can no longer mutate
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`db_mode`, `policy/update`, or `channel_url_list` via POST (returns `403`).
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Lower the security level to `normal` or below to change configuration, or
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perform the change from a trusted entry point. Read access via `GET` is
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unaffected.
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[4.2.1]: https://github.com/Comfy-Org/ComfyUI-Manager/compare/v4.1b6...v4.2.1
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