ComfyUI-Manager/CHANGELOG.md
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feat(security): dedicated install flags decouple git_url/pip install from security_level (#2962)
* feat(security): dedicated install flags decouple git_url/pip from security_level

Install via git URL and pip install are no longer gated by
security_level. Each surface gets a dedicated config.ini flag —
allow_git_url_install / allow_pip_install (both default false, secure
by default) — that fully REPLACES the security-level term for these two
features. The network-position invariant is retained: a non-local
listener stays denied regardless of the flags unless
network_mode = personal_cloud.

- New pure predicate is_dedicated_install_allowed() in
  common/manager_security (no config access; callers resolve config)
- Legacy endpoints /v2/customnode/install/git_url and .../pip switch
  from is_allowed_security_level('high+') to the flag gate; batch
  installs of unknown git URLs likewise (middle+ entry gate unchanged,
  unknown-pip 'block' stays unconditional; response shapes preserved)
- Config readers/writers (glob + legacy) parse and persist the flags;
  denial logs and frontend 403 messages name the responsible flag and
  note the non-local-listener requirement (network_mode=personal_cloud)
- No auto-seed from security_level — users previously on weak/normal-
  must opt in explicitly (see CHANGELOG migration notes; README
  documents the new contract)
- Update the pre-existing permissive E2E harness
  (start_comfyui_permissive.sh + test_e2e_legacy_real_ops.py) to the
  new contract: it now also sets allow_git_url_install /
  allow_pip_install = true, since security_level = normal- alone no
  longer opens the git_url/pip endpoints

Tests: predicate truth table proving security_level independence in
both directions, dual-reader config contract, security-level-matrix
freeze guards, legacy gate regression guards (121 unit), plus 22
real-server E2E tests incl. URL-form pip install with self-clean.

* test(e2e): fix fresh-env failures in customnode_info and git_clone harnesses

Two pre-existing harness defects that fail deterministically on a fresh
E2E environment (unrelated to the dedicated-install-flags change):

- test_e2e_customnode_info: TestInstalledPacks asserted the seed pack
  ComfyUI_SigmoidOffsetScheduler is installed, but nothing seeded it —
  the installing module (test_e2e_endpoint) runs alphabetically later
  and uninstalls it at the end. Add a module-scoped autouse fixture
  that installs the pack via cm-cli BEFORE the server starts (the
  imported-mode test asserts against the startup-frozen snapshot, so
  API-based seeding after boot cannot work) and removes it on teardown
  only if the fixture installed it.
- test_e2e_git_clone: _ensure_cache ran cm-cli update-cache with a
  120s timeout; the full DB download routinely exceeds that on slow
  links, erroring the whole module at setup. Raise to 600s.

Verified from a fresh state (seed pack absent): both modules pass
(13 tests, incl. previously-failing TestInstalledPacks 2 and
TestNightlyInstallCycle 3).
2026-06-11 01:44:12 +09:00

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Markdown

# Changelog
All notable changes to **ComfyUI-Manager** are documented in this file.
The format is based on [Keep a Changelog 1.1.0](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning 2.0.0](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
## [Unreleased]
### Security
- **Dedicated install flags decouple git-URL / pip installs from `security_level`**:
`POST /v2/customnode/install/git_url` and `POST /v2/customnode/install/pip`
(and the batch install path for git URLs not in the custom-node DB) are now
gated by two new `config.ini` `[default]` flags — `allow_git_url_install`
and `allow_pip_install` — instead of `security_level`. Both default to
`false` (secure by default), and a non-loopback listener stays denied unless
`network_mode = personal_cloud` (the existing network-position invariant is
retained — the flags never widen exposure beyond what was possible before).
`security_level` no longer has any effect on these two endpoints, in either
direction. The unknown-pip-package block in batch installs remains
unconditional. Activation requires a restart (no hot reload).
### Migration notes
- **Users running `security_level = weak` or `normal-`**: these environments
could previously use the git-URL / pip install endpoints; after upgrading
they are denied (HTTP 403) until you explicitly opt in by setting
`allow_git_url_install = true` and/or `allow_pip_install = true` in the
`[default]` section of `config.ini`. The flags are NOT auto-seeded from
your `security_level` — explicit opt-in is intentional.
## [4.2.1] - 2026-04-22
Security-hardening release. Contains breaking-ish API changes for
state-mutating endpoints. See **Migration notes** below before upgrading
programmatic clients.
### Security
- **CSRF Content-Type gate**: 18 state-mutation POST handlers (9 in `glob`, 9 in
`legacy`) now reject the three CORS "simple request" Content-Types
(`application/x-www-form-urlencoded`, `multipart/form-data`, `text/plain`).
This closes the residual `<form method="POST">` bypass route that remained
after the GET→POST transition. Legitimate clients using `application/json`
(or no body) are unaffected.
- **`do_fix` security level raised from `high` to `high+`**: aligns the
enforcement gate (`is_allowed_security_level`) with the log text emitted by
`SECURITY_MESSAGE_HIGH_P`. Both `glob/manager_server.py` and
`legacy/manager_server.py` updated in lockstep. Environments running at
`security_level = high` can no longer fix a nodepack — use
`security_level = normal` or lower.
- **Config setters now gated at `middle` security level**:
`POST /v2/manager/db_mode`, `POST /v2/manager/policy/update`, and
`POST /v2/manager/channel_url_list` now check
`is_allowed_security_level('middle')` before mutating configuration (both
`glob` and `legacy`). Closes a pre-existing gap where the write path was
reachable at any security level. Reads (`GET`) remain unrestricted.
### Changed
- **State-changing endpoints converted from `GET` to `POST`** (CSRF hardening):
`/v2/manager/queue/{update_all, reset, start, update_comfyui}`,
`/v2/snapshot/{remove, restore, save}`,
`/v2/comfyui_manager/comfyui_switch_version`,
`/v2/manager/reboot`.
Query-string parameters are preserved where they existed; only the HTTP
method changes.
- **`POST /v2/comfyui_manager/comfyui_switch_version` parameters moved from
query string to JSON body** (REST idiom + body-reading CSRF posture):
The handler now consumes `application/json` with the body shape
`{"ver": "...", "client_id": "...", "ui_id": "..."}` instead of reading
`?ver=...&client_id=...&ui_id=...` from the URL. Because body-reading
handlers are already covered by the CORS-preflight mechanism for
cross-origin protection, the Content-Type rejection gate introduced for
the other state-mutation endpoints is intentionally NOT applied here
(see `comfyui_manager/common/manager_security.py` module docstring).
The first-party JS client in `comfyui_manager/js/comfyui-manager.js`
was updated in the same change; third-party callers must migrate.
- **Config endpoints split into `GET` (read) + `POST` (write)**:
`/v2/manager/{db_mode, policy/update, channel_url_list}`. `GET` returns the
current value; `POST` accepts a JSON body `{"value": "..."}`. The prior
single-method form that accepted a `?value=...` query parameter on either
verb is retired.
- **`openapi.yaml` fully resynchronized** with the server: HTTP methods, the
dual-method splits above, request-body schemas for the new POST setters,
and the `TaskHistoryItem.params` field now match `manager_server.py`.
- **Legacy `restart(self)``restart(request)`**: parameter name corrected.
No behavioral change.
### Added
- **Server-push feature flag `extension.manager.supports_csrf_post`** registered
at startup, allowing ComfyUI-frontend (and other clients) to detect
CSRF-POST backend support as a semantic capability contract, without
relying on version string parsing. Manager versions prior to 4.2.1 do not
set the flag — clients should treat its absence as 'incompatible with
POST-only state-mutation endpoints'.
- **E2E test harness variants** for security-level and legacy-mode scenarios:
`tests/e2e/scripts/start_comfyui_legacy.sh`,
`tests/e2e/scripts/start_comfyui_permissive.sh`,
`tests/e2e/scripts/start_comfyui_strict.sh`. See
`docs/guide/GUIDE_E2E_TEST.md` for usage.
- **`COMFYUI_MANAGER_SKIP_MANAGER_REQUIREMENTS` environment variable**: when
set, skips the `manager_requirements.txt` reinstall path. Intended for E2E
environments where those dependencies are provisioned separately.
- **`TaskHistoryItem.params` field** (Pydantic + `openapi.yaml`): mirrors
`QueueTaskItem.params` so that task history retains the original request
payload (nullable when unavailable).
- **Automated endpoint coverage** — pytest E2E + Playwright specs covering all
39 unique `(method, path)` endpoints across `glob` and `legacy`. Coverage is
tracked in `reports/api-coverage-matrix.md` and
`reports/e2e_test_coverage.md`.
### Removed
- **Legacy per-operation POST routes consolidated into `POST /v2/manager/queue/batch`**:
`/v2/manager/queue/{install, uninstall, update, fix, disable, reinstall, abort_current}`.
The first-party JS client already uses `queue/batch`; only third-party
scripts that call the per-operation routes directly are affected.
- **`GET /manager/notice`** (v1, pip-install redirect banner).
`GET /v2/manager/notice` remains available.
### Migration notes
- Third-party clients calling `POST /v2/manager/queue/install` (and the other
per-operation queue routes) must switch to
`POST /v2/manager/queue/batch` with a body such as
`{"install": [{id, ver, ...}], "batch_id": "..."}`. See
`reports/endpoint_scenarios.md` for the full payload shape.
- Programmatic clients that posted to the CSRF-hardened endpoints with
`application/x-www-form-urlencoded`, `multipart/form-data`, or `text/plain`
must switch to `application/json` (or omit the body entirely when the
endpoint takes its parameters from the query string).
- Clients that called any of the methods listed under **Changed → State-changing
endpoints** with `GET` must switch to `POST`. Query parameters remain valid.
- Clients that wrote configuration via
`GET /v2/manager/{db_mode, policy/update, channel_url_list}?value=...`
must switch to `POST` with JSON body `{"value": "..."}`.
- Third-party scripts calling
`POST /v2/comfyui_manager/comfyui_switch_version?ver=...&client_id=...&ui_id=...`
must switch to `POST` with `Content-Type: application/json` and body
`{"ver": "...", "client_id": "...", "ui_id": "..."}`. The query-string
form no longer works.
- Environments running at `security_level = high` can no longer run
`do_fix`. Either lower the security level (`normal`, `normal-`, or `weak`
as appropriate) or skip the fix operation.
- Environments running at `security_level = high` can no longer mutate
`db_mode`, `policy/update`, or `channel_url_list` via POST (returns `403`).
Lower the security level to `normal` or below to change configuration, or
perform the change from a trusted entry point. Read access via `GET` is
unaffected.
[4.2.1]: https://github.com/Comfy-Org/ComfyUI-Manager/compare/v4.1b6...v4.2.1